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Abstract: 
Recent years have witnessed a growth in research addressing the ways in which 
policymakers, academics and the media characterized the Bosnian war of the 1990s using 
a variety of problematic discursive frames. Relatively few scholars have explored how 
the conflict was often portrayed as a battle between innocent urban centres and an 
antagonistic countryside. This thesis* uses a discourse analysis of Western and Bosnian 
textual material to argue that perceptions of the Bosnian war have been characterized by a 
discourse that attributes the violence to cleavages between urban Bosnians and their rural 
counterparts. Moreover, I engage post-colonial theory to demonstrate that this discourse 
of urban–rural cleavages, in which Western and Bosnian urban self-identity was 
constructed in opposition to the supposed atavism of the Bosnian countryside, is an 
advancement of Bakic-Hayden’s concept of “nesting Orientalisms.” My findings 
problematize a common representation of the conflict, expand the concept of nesting 
Orientalism and help us to understand why urban participation in the ideologies and 
violence of the Bosnian conflict has often gone unexamined. 
(*This working paper is a slight revision of the author’s MA thesis, which was defended 
at Simon Fraser University on January 11, 2017.) 
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Mountain Militarism and Urban Modernity: Balkanism, Identity and 
the Discourse of Urban–Rural Cleavages during the Bosnian War 
 
1. Introduction and Theoretical Approach 
The animosity and violence that accompanied the disintegration of the Yugoslav state 
during the 1990s shocked many both inside and outside of the region. In particular, attempts by 
militant and nationalist groups to fracture Bosnia into “ethnically pure” ethno-religious states, 
quickly becoming the first instance of genocide in Europe since the Second World War, was a 
tragic surprise for many citizens and foreign observers who recalled Bosnia’s reputation as a 
place of amiable coexistence between Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Catholics. In response 
to this conflict, journalists, politicians and academics all strove to explain why pernicious 
xenophobia and violence had erupted in Bosnia after decades of peace. One of the first theories 
produced was that the Bosnian War was the inevitable consequence of intractable centuries-old 
hatreds in the region (Kaufman 2001, 3). While this theory was frequently espoused in major 
media outlets and had a significant impact on policy-makers, it was largely discredited in serious 
academic scholarship. Instead, academics often pointed to the role of macro-economic factors 
(Woodward 1995), opportunistic politicians (Bennett 1995, 63) and media manipulation (Allen 
and Seaton 1999) in fostering the tensions that beset Bosnia in the early 1990s.  
However, another explanation exists, alleging that the Bosnian War was not an ethnic 
war but a struggle between two types of people in Yugoslavia: the progressive, tolerant and 
sophisticated urbanites and the coarse, rancorous and primitive rural denizens of Bosnia’s rugged 
countryside. According to this narrative, which appears to increasingly supplant the 
aforementioned “ancient hatreds” theory, aggressive ethno-nationalism was overwhelmingly a 
rural phenomenon and should be seen as the most recent reiteration of rural inhabitants historical 
anti-urbanism.  
As this thesis will demonstrate, such a narrative has been repeated or alluded to by many 
Western and Bosnian journalists and intellectuals. Despite its prevalence, the notion that the 
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violence of the Bosnian War was a product of the Bosnian countryside has largely escaped 
critical examination in academic literature. Indeed, this thesis analyses several instances of 
Western scholars uncritically circulating this narrative in journal articles or monographs. The 
historically minded analysis of the relationship between highlander and lowlander ethno-
psychological types in Yugoslavia by Marko Zivkovic (1997) is a noteworthy exception, as is 
Xavier Bougarel’s sociological research on the “revenge of the countryside” (1999) and John 
Allock’s work on the socio-economic dimensions of Yugoslavia’s urban–rural differences 
(2002). All three authors recognize the importance of a supposed gulf between the city and the 
countryside in studying the roots of the conflict and their research has contributed greatly to this 
thesis and the field. However, all of the above scholars skirt the questions of identity and 
discourse that are central to the narrative of urban–rural cleavages. Existing literature on the 
relationship between urbanity and the Bosnian War generally uses the categories of “urban” or 
“rural” without considering the normative weight and historical baggage associated with such 
labels and eschewing the theoretical contributions made by post-colonial scholars.  
I argue that the notion of a Bosnian society during the 1990s divided between two 
antithetical cohorts can be seen as part of an urban–rural cleavage discourse, in which local and 
foreign discussion of the Bosnian War rearticulates an image of the Bosnian countryside as a 
place of atavistic mores and violent “Balkan hatreds”. This thesis examines the nature and 
prevalence of the urban–rural cleavage discourse through a post-colonial lens, by which the 
effects of colonization upon the ideas and identity of both the colonizer and the colonized can be 
studied. Using the notions and theories of post-colonialism in this thesis is an attempt to reveal to 
how this discourse, and the constructed “urban” and “rural” identities associated with it, should 
be conceptualized as a continuation of the historical discursive Othering of the Balkans.  
The central aim of this thesis is not to conclusively ascertain the accuracy of the “urban” 
and “rural” labels or the notion of urban–rural cleavages. Rather, this thesis analyses these 
concepts in an effort to determine “what symbols they promoted, what images they projected, 
what interests they were meant to advance” (Bracewell and Drace-Francis 1999, 6), and in so 
doing problematize the constructed urban–rural binary. Moreover, this thesis advances Bakic-
Hayden’s concept of nesting Orientalism by demonstrating how the basis of Othering in Bosnia 
  Urban–Rural Cleavages during the Bosnian War     7 
 
relates not only to one’s cultural status but also to one’s perceived urban identity. In other words, 
I assert that Western and urban Bosnian self-identity was constructed in opposition to the 
supposed backwardness and hatred of rural Bosnians.  
In summary, this thesis seeks to confront two main questions. First, in what way have 
urban–rural cleavages been linked to the hostilities in Bosnia? Second, how can a post-colonial 
theoretical framework, as elucidated by Said, Todorova and Bakic-Hayden, broaden and 
structure our understanding of the popularity of the urban–rural cleavage discourse among both 
foreign observers and urban Bosnians? This thesis addresses the above questions theoretically 
and empirically. The subsequent section of this chapter acts as a theoretical framework, 
introducing the foundations and assumptions of post-structural analysis, as well as its 
contributions to scholarship on the war in Bosnia. The section then introduces post-colonial 
theory by charting the growth of Said’s concept of Orientalism and describing how this concept 
spurred Todorova’s application of post-colonial theory to the Balkans, leading to the 
development of Balkanism. Further sections detail how the concept of nesting Orientalism was 
developed to describe the process of Othering within the region of the former Yugoslavia.  
As a result, in Chapter 2 a methodology for empirical analysis of Western and Bosnian 
textual media and scholarship is devised with this theoretical framework in mind. Chapter 3 
begins with an overview of the historical background behind the ideological relationship between 
urbanity, civilization and the idea of Europe. Next, this chapter charts the empirical results of my 
analysis, organizing the findings by source and theme, and then discusses the results to 
demonstrate how the findings of this thesis can be theoretically conceptualized by expanding 
Bakic-Hayden’s concept of nesting Orientalism. Lastly, Chapter 4 summarizes the thesis and 
outlines its contributions and limitations.  
Theoretical Framework 
Post-structuralism and the Balkans  
Since the 1990s, there has been a proliferation of literature produced by journalists, 
public figures and academics that purports to explain the apparently senseless bloodshed that 
accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia into its current successor states. However, one of the 
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principal weaknesses of many traditional academic accounts of the civil war has been their 
reliance on a materialist ontology and their inattention to the ways in which the conflict was 
conceptualized and explained by the wider public. In addition, traditional analyses of the war 
concentrate on the interests of the various states and militias, failing to see the way in which the 
identities of these groups were often formulated in opposition to each other. Fortunately, the 
publication of academic literature on the Bosnian War coincided with a mounting number of 
articles in civil war studies and international relations that utilized constructivist perspectives. 
Constructivists contend that social facts are dependent upon human agreement and that “the 
manner in which social facts become established is considered relevant to the way in which they 
exert their influence” (Adler 1997, 339). Accompanying the constructivist turn was a renewed 
application of post-structural analysis to violent conflict.  
As a result of these two trends, scholars have begun to pay particular attention to 
coverage of the conflict in the media and in academia, discovering that popular explanations of 
the conflict often relied upon essentializing stereotypes and depoliticized explanations 
(Hammond 2005). Scholars have worked especially hard to dismantle the pernicious notion that 
the Bosnian War was rooted in so-called “ancient/tribal hatreds” (Guzina 1999). David 
Campbell’s thorough book National Deconstruction (1998) is the premiere post-structural 
reappraisal of the conflict’s causes. Campbell expanded the boundaries of the intellectual debate 
by providing a counter-narrative to the mainstream representation of the war as an inevitable 
outcome of the “unnatural” cohabitation of various national identities on a shared territory. 
According to Campbell, the idea of supposedly historical ethnic divisions was fabricated post 
facto to justify violence and was then parroted by Western journalists, policymakers and 
politicians.  
Another seminal work on the Bosnian War was Lene Hansen’s Security as Practice 
(2006), which utilized post-structural theory to meticulously outline links between Western 
foreign policy and identity. In addition to providing a helpful methodological template for 
discourse analysis (elucidated in the Methodology chapter of this thesis) Hansen scrutinizes 
Western political debates and media reports to show how different degrees of otherness in the 
Balkans drove Western policymaking in that region. Hansen also identifies the development of a 
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“Balkan Discourse” in which the notorious tribal hatreds and intractable violence of the Balkans 
legitimized a policy of tragic inaction (Chapter 6). According to Hansen, a “Genocide 
Discourse,” in which multi-cultural Bosnia represented European identity and Western inaction 
posed a threat to Western identity, soon challenged the “Balkan Discourse” (Chapter 6). While 
Hansen’s analysis of the West’s construction of the Balkans is penetrating, she mostly neglects 
to look at the self-representation of the Balkans by the people of the region themselves. In 
addition, Hansen stops short of fully developing her concept of a middle position between the 
“Other” and the “Self” in her analysis of how otherness conditioned Western policymaking. 
One of the great advantages of post-structural scholarship like that of Hansen and 
Campbell, as well as the post-colonial research that was post-structuralism’s theoretical progeny, 
is that it recognizes the importance of discourse in conflicts, which can reveal how dominant 
conceptions are created and how alternative representations are excluded, often implicitly. 
Moreover, post-structural scholarship recognizes the important linkages between power and 
knowledge; in the words of its founding father, “power and knowledge are mutually supportive; 
they directly imply one another” (Foucault 1979, 27). Since the central focus of my research is 
the creation and propagation of a discourse painting the conflict as a result of urban–rural 
tensions, I adopt a post-structural approach to the subject matter. Furthermore, since I conceive 
of this discourse as an extension of the West’s self-identity construction in opposition to a 
supposed Other, the post-colonial approach popularized by Edward Said will also be used.  
Post-Colonialism  
Said’s seminal work Orientalism (1978) significantly ruptured academic understandings 
of the West’s relationship with the Orient, creating an entire subfield of international relations 
theory and shifting third world studies away from the prevailing paradigms of economic 
development and modernization and toward cultural and discursive analysis. Said refined and 
furthered the discourse analysis pioneered by Foucault to explore how Western scholars, writers 
and artists essentialized the Orient in order to justify imperialist attitudes and policies. Like many 
other post-structural scholars, Said did not simply treat the discourse of Orientalism as a static 
ideology but instead chose to trace the development of the discourse from its beginnings at the 
turn of the 18th Century to its current manifestation. Through myriad textual examples, Said 
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revealed how the Western image of the Orient became one of despotism, beguiling sensuality, 
and irrationality, with the corresponding European self-image of good governance, virtue and 
rationality. 
Said’s critique was not, however, an attempt to portray the French, British and now 
American scholars who specialized in the Orient as necessarily untruthful or malevolent but 
rather to illustrate the extent to which the discipline was embedded in a colonial understanding of 
the world, resulting in an academic perception of the Orient that justified Western dominance. In 
fact, Said’s commanding book was less about the Middle East and more about the Western self-
perception that resulted from a collection of self-professed experts who constructed an 
intellectual system that determined what the Middle East “was” and who could “know” it. While 
Said concentrated on Europe’s depictions of the Middle East, his approach and conceptual 
framework led to an outpouring of subsequent studies that applied post-colonial and Orientalist 
theory to numerous other contexts (Gorovogui 2007).  
Said’s concept of Orientalism and approach toward discourse plays a crucial role in my 
research as it provides a helpful conceptual framework for understanding the creation of a 
discourse that delineates the Self and the Other. In the case of this thesis, Orientalism can help to 
show how urban Yugoslav self-identity was centered on its contrast to the rural Other. However, 
while there was overt imperial subjugation of the Middle East by the colonial powers of Europe, 
the relationship between western and south-eastern Europe has been more complicated, with its 
own particular set of imperialist nuances and representations. As a result, while the European 
understanding of the Balkans mirrors many aspects of Orientalism, Said’s concepts cannot 
necessarily be applied neatly to the region. Consequently, in this section I will seek to chart the 
various theoretical outcomes of post-colonial scholarship’s study of the Balkans.  
While several scholars have conducted acclaimed research regarding Europe’s identity 
vis-à-vis Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994; Neumann 1999; Bejlic and Savic 2002; Kuus 2004), 
Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden were the first to extend post-colonial theory to south-
eastern Europe specifically, seeing a direct parallel between the attitude of Europeans toward the 
Balkans and the foundational logic and narrative that underpinned Orientalism (Bakic-Hayden 
and Hayden 1992). Hayden and Bakic-Hayden assert that the logic of Orientalism can be found 
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in the writings of foreign journalists as well as from some Yugoslavs themselves, albeit primarily 
from the northern regions of the state (2). The authors point to how the centuries of Ottoman, 
thus Oriental, rule in the Balkans led to a rhetoric that represented the Balkans as a cultural, 
political and religious other to the “proper” Europe of north-western Europe (3). Furthermore, 
the new demarcation of liberal west and oppressed east during the Cold War replicated and 
solidified this symbolic geography (3). 
Intersecting this symbolic geography is the perceived hierarchy of religions in the 
Balkans, with Croatian or Slovenian Catholicism seen as more “European” (and thus more 
desirable) than the Orthodox Christianity of the Serbs, which is in turn perceived as more 
“European” than the Islamic faith of the Bosniaks or Kosovars (5). It is at this point that the 
authors introduce the concept of “nesting Orientalisms” (4), or a system in which each region 
perceives its own culture, religion and society as superior to those of its more southern 
counterpart; this concept is developed further in subsequent research by Bakic-Hayden (1995) 
and will be elaborated upon later in this thesis. In this imaginary chain, with the Protestant 
powers of Northern Europe at its apex, the seemingly neutral distinction between northern and 
southern, eastern and western, becomes irrevocably imbued with meaning, privileging and 
valorizing the Catholic and former Hapsburg regions over those that governed by the Ottomans 
(Bakic-Hayden and Hayden 1992, 5).  
Through numerous examples from the media and journals, the authors demonstrate how 
contemporary stereotypes of the various ethnic groups in the Balkans are based upon the 
religions of conquerors that have been absent from the region for more than a century, with one 
New York Times article (6 April 1990, A8) deeming the Slovenes to be “industrious Roman 
Catholic Slavs whose culture was shaped by centuries spent under Austrian rule” in contrast with 
their “strange and threatening” Muslim or Orthodox neighbours. The Slovenian philosopher 
Slavoj Zizek was also one of the first scholars to comment on the parallels between European 
attitudes toward the Orient, and European attitudes toward the Balkans. Zizek’s explication of 
the Balkans’ imaginary and intangible location within Europe fits with Said’s conception of the 
Orient as an ill-defined region, detached from any specific lands. Additionally, borrowing no 
doubt from his background in psychoanalysis, Zizek claims that the Balkans serves as Europe’s 
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“persistent reminder of its own past” (1992), a ghost that reminds Europe of its own past of 
bloody ethnic violence, long since tamed by European civilization. Zizek’s critique becomes 
even more provocative, alleging that the Balkans constitutes a “place of exception with regard to 
which the tolerant multiculturalist is allowed to act out his/her repressed racism” (1992) since the 
condemnation is directed not at people of colour but at white Europeans.  
Balkanism 
While Hayden, Bakic-Hayden and Zizek saw replicas of the West’s disparaging view of 
the Middle East in Europe’s attitude toward southeastern Europe, other scholars have argued that 
Orientalism is an inadequate or even misleading designation. While written several years after 
Bakic-Hayden’s article on nesting Orientalisms, Maria Todorova’s much-discussed Imagining 
the Balkans (1997) was the book that brought the debate over the representation of the Balkans 
to the forefront of post-colonial research. Like Said, Todorova spends a significant portion of her 
book drawing on an extensive array of travelogues, letters, academic treatises and journalistic 
accounts to outline the development of “the Balkans” as an idea through the last several 
centuries. Furthermore, Todorova’s consistent treatment of every text as a discursive interaction 
between the reader, the writer and the existing literature represents a brilliant example of 
intertextuality in action. 
However, Todorova also recognizes the importance of a multiplicity of disciplinary 
perspectives in her endeavour and thus reinforces her post-colonial theory with references to 
other scholars of national identity like Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. While Bakic-
Hayden makes no mention of the Balkan wars of the early 20th Century, Todorova posits that it is 
this conflict that associated the Balkans with intractable and primordial conflict in the minds of 
outside observers, an association that resurged during the 1990s to dominate western coverage of 
the civil war. In addition to the already prevailing stereotypes of tribalism and 
underdevelopment, “Balkan violence” came to define Western imagery of the Balkans. For 
Todorova, the relationship between Europe and the Balkans is too complex to be understood 
simply as Orientalism, deserving instead its own term: Balkanism. Todorova defends the creation 
of this new term by defining several crucial differences between the Balkans and the Orient. 
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First, while Todorova also records several of the Orientalist characterisations Bakic-
Hayden points to, she argues that many of the “Oriental” traits were never attributed to the 
Balkans. For example, Todorova points to Said’s observation that the West saw itself as 
mechanistic compared to the refined, mystic and exotic sensuality of the Orient (11). In contrast, 
Western representations of the Balkans portrayed the land and its people as crude, brutish and 
primitive (11). In the words of Bozo Jezernik, the word ‘Balkans’ conjures “a negative 
connotation of slovenliness, passivity, unreliability, disrespect toward women, conniving, 
unscrupulousness, opportunism, laziness, superstition, inconsistent and overzealous bureaucracy 
and so forth” (2003, 23).  
Second, while Said pointed to an Orientalism produced by Europe against an Other 
outside of Europe, Todorova looks at the Balkans as a transitory space inside, or at least 
alongside, Europe, similar to Europe but fundamentally incomplete. For Todorova, Balkanism 
represents the “imputed” ambiguity, the differences within a single type, while Orientalism 
represents the imputed opposition between two types, the West and the Orient. The marginal 
position of the Balkans within Europe’s symbolic cartography was exacerbated by the historical 
fact of the Ottoman conquest; indeed, one traditional English moniker for the Balkans before the 
19th Century was “Turkey-in-Europe” (Glenny 1999, 12). The Balkans’ simultaneous inclusion 
and exclusion from symbolic Europe contributed to its image as bridge between West and East, 
as well as a bridge between levels of growth (Todorova 1997, 16). The portrayal of the Balkans 
as locked in a marginal or transitional state is crucial, as transitional states are considered 
dangers, both to themselves and to others (17). At the same time, Todorova claims, the people of 
the Balkans constructed their own self-identity against their own Orient, be it the Ottoman 
Empire or even their “less-European” neighbour; here Todorova is echoing Bakic-Hayden’s 
concept of nesting Orientalism. Regrettably, Todorova’s sampling of Yugoslav intellectuals and 
commentators is rather sparse and she stops short of exploring the role of local self-
representation.  
 In addition to their physical presence in or at the doorstep of Europe, the inhabitants of 
the Balkans remain, particularly in skin colour, outwardly similar to Europeans. Todorova also 
points to the overwhelmingly Islamic character of the Orient as opposed to the Christianity of 
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both Northern Europe and the Balkans, although she seems to ignore the hierarchy of 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy that Bakic-Hayden revealed. Todorova, in opposition to Hayden and 
Bakic-Hayden, argues that the people of the Balkans haven’t been orientalized but rather have 
been represented as “the differences within one type” (19). Put differently, the people of the 
Balkans are allowed to be “European” and white but are seen as less civilized and more 
bloodthirsty than the prototypical European. Finally, Todorova distinguishes Balkanism from 
Said and Bakic-Hayden’s Orientalism by arguing that the Balkans, while it may possess fluid 
and intellectually contested borders, does occupy a more concrete geographical space than the 
amorphous and “intangible nature of the Orient” ever did (16). 
  
Andrew Hammond has parsed the differences between the Balkanist and the Orientalist 
post-colonial approaches to the Balkans in even greater detail. Hammond points out that there 
was never an established field of Balkan studies in Western academia, in contrast to the 
extensive field of Oriental linguistic, historical and textual study that was, according to Said, the 
most important foundation for modern Orientalism (Hammond 2007, 202). In fact, Hammond 
draws on his background in 19th and 20th Century literature to illustrate how European writings 
on the Balkans were not academic studies but, more typically, in the form of adventure fiction or 
travelogues (203). Hammond notes that most popular literature regarding the Balkans has 
traditionally been addressed to non-specialists and written by supposed experts drawing on 
journalistic or travel experience; the popularity of these accounts has usually exploded in tandem 
with the outbreak of violence in the region (203).  
In the end, Hammond finds Balkanism to be more than a mere sub-species of 
Orientalism; instead, it is an identity of its own, neither Oriental nor European. In addition to 
lacking the tradition of formal knowledge-production that was part of Orientalism, the Balkans 
also had a different experience of European imperialism. While Said repeatedly emphasized the 
imperial context of Orientalism’s discourse production, Hammond concurs with Todorova’s 
assertion that the absence of European or American imperial interests in the Balkans led to a 
different representation of it in the Western mind. According to Todorova, her “predisposition 
for historical specificity” (16) prevented her from finding any instances of colonialism or 
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imperialism, strictly defined. While this commitment to specificity is commendable, I fear that 
the author risks missing out on the insights that can be produced by comparing the period of 
Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian rule to the era of Western colonialism in the Middle East. 
Moreover, both Hammond and Todorova fail to engage with the growing body of literature that 
describes the EU and American relationship with the region as neo-colonial (Petrovic 2010; 
Jusdanis 1998; Lisiak 2010).  
Nevertheless, any shortfalls of the Balkanist approach are more than compensated for by 
Todorova’s thorough research, which is buttressed by an astounding variety and amount of 
primary sources, and by the historical and geographic specificity of Todorova’s concepts. 
Moreover, Todorova correctly points out the significance of the Balkans symbolic location, their 
“in-betweeness” (18), a distinction overlooked by Hayden and Bakic-Hayden who saw the 
cognitive division separating Europe and the Orient in simpler binary terms, leading me to 
generally prefer her concept of Balkanism over Hayden and Bakic-Hayden’s concept of 
Orientalism in the Balkans.  
Nesting Orientalism/Balkanism 
As mentioned earlier, Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden coined the term nesting 
Orientalism to describe the way in which various regions within Yugoslavia and its 
contemporary successor states construct an image of their neighbour to be less “European” and 
more “Oriental” than themselves. The concrete consequences of this phenomenon have been 
pointed to by scholars like Cveta Koneska (2007), who attributes the failure of formal 
regionalization in the Balkans to a nesting Orientalism that spurred “competition between states 
on how not be associated with the Balkans” (83). Additionally, Nicole Lindstrom (2003) argues 
that Slovenia’s accession to the European Union, nearly a decade before Croatia’s acceptance, 
was due in part to Slovenia’s successful differentiation of itself from the Balkans (317).  
Three years after Bakic-Hayden devised the term nesting Orientalism, she revisited it in 
an article that explored the term in further depth, defining it as “a pattern of reproduction of the 
original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised” (Bakic-Hayden 1995, 918). Bakic-
Hayden observed that, for many in Europe, the frontier of the Balkans was always southeast of 
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the speaker, a symbolic cartography that privileged one’s own position as a tolerant, rational and 
disciplined European at the expense of the Oriental ‘other’ (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden 1992, 4). 
Orientalism, according to Bakic-Hayden’s theory, has long been redeployed internally in an 
effort to cast the Balkan image off of oneself and onto another. Put differently, the various 
inhabitants of the Balkans concurred with the Balkan stereotypes propagated by northern 
Europeans but consistently attributed these stereotypes to the Other below them on the map 
(Volcic 2007, 173; Luhar and Luhar 2003). Zizek described the unfolding of nesting 
Orientalisms in the Balkans thusly: 
For Serbs, [the Balkans] begin in Kosovo or in Bosnia where Serbia is trying to defend 
civilised Christian Europe against the encroachments of this Other. For the Croats, the 
Balkans begins in Orthodox, despotic and Byzantine Serbia, against which Croatia 
safeguards Western democratic values. For many Italians and Austrians, they begin in 
Slovenia, the Western outpost of the Slavic hordes. For many Germans, Austria is tainted 
with Balkan corruption and inefficiency; for many Northern Germans, Catholic Bavaria 
is not free of Balkan contamination. Many arrogant Frenchmen associate Germany with 
Eastern Balkan brutality – it lacks French finesse. Finally, to some British opponents of 
the European Union, Continental Europe is a new version of the Turkish Empire with 
Brussels as the new Istanbul – a voracious despotism threatening British freedom and 
sovereignty. (1999, 3) 
 
Geographic proximity to Turkey, the archetypal Orient on Europe’s doorstep, is not the only axis 
upon which the Balkan symbolic geography is constantly being divided and re-divided into 
Europe and the Orient. In addition to the privileging of Catholicism over Orthodoxy and Islam, 
Bakic-Hayden (1992, 4) writes that distinctions are made on the basis of script (Cyrillic and 
Latin) and 20th Century ideology (capitalist and socialist, Warsaw Pact and non-aligned). This 
process has also been termed a “delegating mechanism” by Kuus (2004), in which countries 
discover the foreign disdain for their nation and their culture and thus develop “an inferiority 
complex… which shifts to finding the ‘other’ outside one’s nation to blame” (Anderson 2007, 6). 
The concept of nesting Orientalism is an invaluable tool in understanding identity in 
Europe but there are several gaps in Bakic-Hayden’s theory that I wish to fill in this thesis. First, 
while Bakic-Hayden focused on cataloguing and critiquing instances of nesting Orientalism in 
the years preceding or during the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, I seek to illustrate how an 
orientalist discourse that emphasized the supposed gulf between the violent and primitive 
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countryside and a peaceful urbanity existed throughout the decades previous and has been 
deployed even after the war. Furthermore, Bakic-Hayden, Kuus and Andersen fail to consider the 
possibility that “nesting” does not only take place between nationalities or “outside one’s 
nation.” Consequently, I will widen the debate on nesting Orientalism by demonstrating that 
“nesting” can also occur within a nation, even between members of the same ethno-religious 
group. Lastly, I assert that “nesting Orientalism” is better termed “nesting Balkanism” instead, 
since Todorova’s concept of Balkanism more accurately reflects the liminal and semi-peripheral 
nature of the Balkans and captures the particular negative popular image of the Balkans. 
Accordingly, I will henceforth use the term “nesting Balkanism” to denote the process in which 
groups in the Balkans reproduce dominant constructed hierarchies of Otherness.  
It should be noted at this point that I am mindful of the potential risks in applying a 
theory about the Balkans in general to Bosnia, a single country. However, I maintain that this 
approach is defensible given the extent to which Bosnia and “the Balkans” were often conflated 
by outside observers. Indeed, many Western writers and journalists regarded the Bosnian conflict 
of the 1990s as something inherently “Balkan,” characterized by a uniquely “Balkan violence” 
and “Balkan hatred” (Hatzopolous 2008, 42). Many of the most influential and popular books on 
the war make explicit connections between the violence in Bosnia itself and the wider region, 
ignoring the fact that most other republics and states transitioned relatively peacefully into post-
socialist systems.1 As Todorova points out, the Spanish Civil War was never described as an 
Iberian war and the Greek Civil War escaped the “Balkan” label (186). Thus, the deliberate 
externalizing of the Bosnian War to the ‘Balkans’ and its attendant negative images is indicative 
of the Balkanism already elucidated earlier in this thesis. With its supposed internecine butchery 
and its Byzantine politics, Bosnia represents the archetypal Balkan nation in the minds of many 
Westerners (Burg and Shoup 1999, 18). Since Bosnia and the Balkans are regularly, and 
purposefully, used interchangeably by popular commentators, and I am analyzing popular 
narratives of the Bosnian War, I assert that Todorova and Bakic-Hayden’s theoretical precepts on 
                                                          
1 For example: Balkan Tragedy (1995), Balkan Babel (1992), The Fall of Yugoslavia: the Third Balkan War (1992), 
The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans (1997), Balkan Odyssey (1995). 
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identity and representation in the Balkans are not only applicable but acutely significant in 
Bosnia itself.  
In summary, I study how the Bosnian war was constructed as a battle between the city 
and the countryside by building upon the theoretical foundations provided by post-structuralism 
and post-colonialism in several ways. First, inspired by the contributions given by Hansen and 
Campbell’s post-structural analysis, I focus on how a discourse of urban–rural cleavages 
developed and conditioned the way in which the conflict was represented to Bosnians and the 
world. Second, I use Said, Bakic-Hayden and Todorova’s understandings of identity and 
construction of an ‘other’ to demonstrate that the idea of an urban–rural divide, largely ignored 
by those authors, should also be recognized as a salient axis upon which civilized Europe was 
delineated from the rural Orient during the Bosnian War. Third, I build upon and reformulate 
Bakic-Hayden’s concept of nesting Orientalism to argue that the widespread usage of the 
“urban–rural cleavage” discourse within Bosnia should be seen as a manifestation of nesting 
Balkanism. 
2. Analyzing Textual Discourse: A Methodology 
Since “the intentions of the analyst always guides the theory and method” (Rogers 2004, 
3), my goal of illuminating and historicizing the prevalent discourse of urban–rural cleavages 
benefits from the tools of discourse analysis. Consequently, I utilize discourse analysis to answer 
my research questions. While discourse analysis is marked by its vast internal heterogeneity 
(Laffey and Weldes, 2004), its foundations rest in Michel Foucault’s seminal The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969), which marked a shift in academia towards supplementing analysis of the 
material world with analysis of the way in which things are discussed and conceptualized. 
Foucault posited that knowledge (and therefore power) was produced through discourse. 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin describe Foucault’s theory of discourse as: 
…. a system of statements within which the world can be known. It is the system by 
which dominant groups in society constitute the field of truth by imposing specific 
knowledge’s, disciplines and values upon dominated groups. As a social formation it 
works to constitute reality not only for the objects it appears to represent, but also for the 
subject who form the community on which it depends. (2000, 42) 
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Indeed, discourse analysis eschews attempts to assert “Truths” in favour of analyzing 
how power is constituted through language and knowledge. Foucault’s concepts of social order 
inform this thesis’ approach to power and discourse, but conducting discourse analysis requires 
additional methodological and theoretical understandings, which can be broken down into 
several parts.  
First, while I share with constructivist scholars their understanding of meaning as 
something constructed by people, my analysis follows the example of most other discourse 
theorists by also analyzing who has the authority to construct meaning and identity, and in what 
manner. The poststructuralist focus on relationally constituted identity is a fundamental 
ontological departure from conventional constructivist theory (Hansen 2006, 21). Accordingly, 
discourse analysis’ concentration on privileged positions and binary oppositions is a crucial trait 
that distinguishes it from other interpretive methodologies (Milliken 1999). Thus, I hope to 
situate those who propagated this discourse in the wider power structures of Yugoslavia and 
Europe in order to illustrate how “the authority to speak” shaped the way in which the discourse 
of rural militant anti-urbanism was formed and disseminated. The role of academics in 
legitimating certain discourses due to their esteemed position as holders of scientific “truth” is 
especially critical (Milliken 1999) and will be an important part of my analysis. However, it is 
important to consider Richard Price’s admonition that scholars should not assume that the power 
hierarchies behind dominant norms necessarily align with material power hierarchies (Price 
1995, 88). Consequently, my discourse analysis will remain cognizant of the fact that military 
power and capability in Bosnia was often wholly separate from ideological and normative power 
and capability.  
The second component of discourse analysis is to determine the object’s place relative to 
other objects, revealing how an object’s identity is relationally constructed. Consequently, I will 
examine how rural areas and their citizens were categorized and conceptualized in direct 
opposition to their urban counterparts in the literature mentioned above. To be specific, my 
analysis summarized briefly above will focus on the detailed manifestations of discourse in 
language (Fairclough, 1995). For instance, does the text under analysis use ‘loaded’ or emotive 
language (e.g. “rednecks” and “hillbillies”)? Grammatically, what does the pronoun usage of the 
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author reveal about their identities (e.g. “us” and “them”)? What is the prevalence of 
evidentialities in the text; are there phrases that imply assumed factualities (e.g. “it is well known 
that…)? Does the writer rely upon suggestive rhetorical techniques (e.g. hyperboles, historical 
allusions, similes)? These are the sorts of questions that will guide my collection of material and 
determine what material is relevant to my thesis. Naturally, I will not focus solely on the specific 
language communicated but will analyze the language within the social and political 
environment; as Tarik Jusic (2009) puts it, “to analyze discourse is to analyze meanings that 
emerge through the use of language in context” (31).  
Of course, discovering and collecting this sort of material is not sufficient without careful 
interpretation. Consequently, I will engage in an explanation of how the urban–rural cleavage 
discourse operates and what it means for our understanding of the Bosnian civil war. My 
interpretation will be couched in the theoretical understandings of Todorova. Inspired by Said’s 
ontology of the Orient in Western imagination, Todorova developed the concept of Balkanism, 
asserting that Western Europeans constructed the Balkans as a place of primitivism and violence, 
against which Europe could build a self-identity as a place of modernity and enlightenment (7). I 
hope to use Balkanism as a theoretical lens through which one can understand how and why the 
urban–rural discourse was reproduced.  
The discursive material being analysed in this thesis is textual, due to the preponderance 
of written material produced on the Bosnian conflict (e.g. newspaper reports, editorials, books, 
journal articles, periodicals, etc.) and the easy accessibility of written material from decades past. 
Visual material (e.g. photographs, documentaries, television reporting) was a major medium 
during the period of the Yugoslav conflict and there is certainly potential for invigorating 
research on the portrayal of Bosnia’s urban–rural cleavage in television journalism and cinema. 
However, a proper analysis of discourse in visual material, with an examination of the speech, 
images, music, sound and cinematography involved, deserves a more comprehensive and 
expansive analysis than allowed by the confines of this thesis. Furthermore, visual material on 
Yugoslavia produced from decades past is relatively scarce, thus potentially limiting the 
historical scope of my analysis.  
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As a result, books, academic publications and journalistic reports are my primary sources 
for Western opinion on the urban–rural cleavage. News media accounts of the conflict will be 
especially highlighted as I see them as a potent source of power, in line with other scholars of 
international politics (Dalby 1990). Print media’s “ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, 
public attention and political influence, should generate an intrinsic interest… [it] very much 
reflects the social mainstream” (Kryzanowski and Wodak 2008b, 32). Public statements and 
interviews, novels and academic research will be my primary source for Yugoslav opinion. The 
diversity of genres selected in this thesis is the result of an attempt to illustrate how certain 
modes of imagining the Balkans permeate epistemic boundaries, crossing both scholarly and 
non-scholarly modes of knowledge.  
While there are obvious practical challenges in studying discourse in such a range of 
materials, there are potential gains to be made from intertexualization, which can be a potent 
method of discovering cross-genre similarities in discourse (Hopf 2012). The concept of 
intertextuality stems from Julia Kristeva’s (1980) exploration of how meaning is mediated 
through ideas and symbols embedded in other texts. Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality 
represents a reappraisal of the idea of intersubjectivity, in which meaning is imparted directly 
from the writer to the reader (69). Kristeva’s concepts were elaborated further by Roland Barthes 
(1977), who demonstrated that a text’s meaning is embedded not only in the text itself but also 
woven into a wider network of pre-existing texts. On a practical level, scholars discern 
intertextuality by tracing links between texts “through continued reference to a topic or main 
actors; through reference to the same events; or by transfer of main arguments from one text into 
the next” (Krzyanowski and Wodak 2008a, 205). As a result, my analysis will emphasize the 
ways in which the material I analyze is engaged in an implicit, or even explicit, dialogue with 
other material.  
Regarding the source material to be analyzed in my research, I find that the ideal types 
suggested by Hansen in Security as Practice (2006) for designing discourse analysis are helpful 
in structuring the analytical scope of my research. Hansen stresses the importance of 
intertexualization when analysing discourse, not only between different authors at similar levels 
but also between texts produced by different genres (50-55). In keeping with her commitment to 
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the development of organized discourse analysis methodologies, Hansen has devised four 
categories, or models, for intertextual research on the basis of what material a researcher is 
analyzing (53-59). The official discourse produced by heads of state, senior civil servants and 
high-ranking military personnel is the analytical focus of Model 1, while Model 2 incorporates 
the discourse of opposition to these governing figures. For instance, research designed along 
Hansen’s Model 2 would look at the discourse propagated by both official government 
pronouncements as well as the discourse produced in parliamentary debates or within newspaper 
editorials. Model 3’s analytical scope expands to embrace nongovernmental material that does 
not overtly engage with the official discourse (Model 3A) or which is explicitly engaging with 
official discourse but only from the margins of the public debate (Model 3B). Hansen sees Model 
3A as focusing on cultural representations in popular culture and the arts, while Model 3B 
analyzes material produced by academics, non-governmental organizations and marginal 
newspapers and books. 
For Hansen, discourse analysis is at its strongest when texts from multiple models are 
analysed in conjunction, allowing the analyst to discern the dominance of a discourse and the 
extent to which it is reproduced or challenged through references to other texts (190). Thus, my 
analysis will draw from multiple models in an effort to illuminate how various sites of 
knowledge production constructed a discourse of urban–rural cleavages to explain the war in 
Bosnia. Since I seek to chart and problematize a discourse found in both popular print media and 
academic literature surrounding the Bosnian civil war, this thesis analyzes source material from 
Model 2 and Model 3B. This thesis will not, however, include an analysis of material at the level 
of Model 1. There has already been a great deal of impressive research in recent years on the 
discourse produced at the highest level of government regarding the conflict in Bosnia. 
Furthermore, the urban–rural cleavage discourse explicated in this thesis was largely absent in 
the discourse produced by Western generals, policymakers and politicians, whose statements and 
policies engaged instead in the “genocide discourse” or in what scholars have deemed the 
“ancient hatreds.” Popular culture and other artistic material produced under the umbrella of 
Model 3A is beyond the capabilities and scope of this thesis. However, I have little doubt that an 
analysis of this sort of material by a researcher with greater time, and a first-hand knowledge of 
local cultural nuances and references, could reinforce and broaden the findings of this thesis.  
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Most of the material I analyze has been accessed virtually, with online databases being 
used to reach academic sources from the countries of the former Yugoslavia as well as from 
Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia. Most major news services, Western or 
otherwise, have digitized their coverage of the Bosnian civil war. I have used LexisNexis 
Academic, an online electronic database of full-text articles, as the main avenue of accessing this 
journalistic coverage of the war. In gathering my source material, I searched for news articles 
written in English between January 1991 and January 1996, roughly one year before and one 
year after the war in Bosnia, which mention the words “Bosnia” or “Yugoslavia” along with the 
words “war”, or “conflict” or “battle”.  
The large amount of results returned by this search precluded an exhaustive analysis of 
every result, so I devised a ‘stopping rule’, a point at which I could cease collecting and 
analyzing material. Post-structuralist discourse analysis operates without a codified quantitative 
methodology, so researchers cannot easily rely upon statistical significance to determine the 
optimal amount of texts for analysis (Hansen 2006, 77). Moreover, sample size is less of a focus 
in many studies of discourse analysis than the variety of ways in which language is used (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987, 161). Consequently, my stopping rule is based on Milliken’s suggestion to 
halt analysis when “upon adding new texts and comparing their object spaces, the research finds 
consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated work for those texts” (Milliken 
1999, 234). My selection of texts from within these initial results also follows Hansen’s 
recommendation on determining whether a text is important enough to be included in my 
analysis by assessing whether it has influenced a wide audience or come from a speaker who has 
the authority to influence the topic being discussed (Hansen 2006, 79). In the end, I ceased my 
data collection after looking through a total of 440 newspaper articles and editorials. A 
representative sample of the urban–rural cleavage narrative found within many of these articles, 
and my analysis of it, is included in Chapter 3 of this thesis (in the section titled “A ‘Deliverance 
Scenario’…”).  
Since these articles are downloaded from an online database, non-textual elements of the 
source material, such as layout, surrounding articles and accompanying images, cannot be taken 
into account. While these elements can offer additional support to a discourse analysis, the 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 56/2017      24 
 
breadth of such analysis is beyond this thesis’ resources. Another potential limitation of my 
source material is that many smaller newspapers have not yet digitized issues published during 
the Bosnian war. However, given that most of these papers would have been reproducing content 
generated by the larger media companies and my interest is in analyzing material that reflected 
and influenced popular opinion, I contend that my inability to access these sources has had little 
impact on the research as a whole.  
All textual material studied in this thesis was written or translated into English, as I 
cannot read Serbo-Croatian. Fortunately, English is the lingua franca of Western academia and 
most writers from the Yugoslav states had their works translated in order to reach audiences 
outside of the immediate region (Filipovic 2013). As mentioned earlier, texts were selected based 
upon a consideration of whether the text in question influenced a wide audience or was produced 
by someone with the authority to influence the topic. There are certainly un-translated texts that 
pertain to my topic but that are directed for, and consumed by, Bosnian audiences only. 
However, the focus of this thesis on material produced by the higher levels of academia and 
journalism engaging in a dialogue with international audiences (Model 2 and Model 3B in 
Hansen’s blueprint) suggests that these texts would be of comparatively lesser value for my 
analysis. 
3. A Discourse Analysis of the Bosnian Conflict 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of this thesis’ discourse analysis by 
detailing the various ways in which the urban–rural discourse manifests itself in textual sources. 
I commence with a brief overview of the social and historical circumstances that have led to the 
West’s contemporary understand of the relationship between violence, the city and civilization. I 
then move to studying Western portrayals of the conflict as a rural phenomenon so that I can 
illustrate the Balkanism inherent in such a narrative – first analyzing Western newspapers printed 
during the conflict or in the immediate aftermath of hostilities, and then analyzing post-war 
academic literature on the Bosnian War. In the final sections of this chapter I narrow the scope of 
my analysis and ‘zoom in’ on the portrayal of the conflict by Yugoslavs and Bosnians 
themselves to refine my analysis and demonstrate how the Balkanist urban–rural cleavage 
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discourse found in Western writing on the conflict was not simply projected by the West upon a 
passive Balkan audience but was reproduced and reinforced by elite and urban citizens.  
The City and Civilization in the Western Imagination 
The discourse of urban–rural cleavages, like other discourses and interpretative frames, 
arises from being evoked by texts and also by being invoked by the readers of those texts 
(Fillmore, 1985: 232). In other words, the urban–rural cleavage discourse is articulated and 
propagated in two ways. First, the discourse is evoked by the metaphors, lexical choices, and 
other linguistic mechanisms of the writer. Second, the discourse is invoked by the interpreter of a 
text who works through a text by interpreting it against a background of urban and rural 
stereotypes. Before analysing how the urban–rural cleavage discourse has been textually 
articulated in Western reporting and scholarship, it is important to give a brief, and by no means 
comprehensive, overview of the normative connotations that condition the interpreter’s 
“invoking” of a text. In the following paragraphs, I will explain how a discourse equating 
urbanity with civilisation and peaceful tolerance rests upon several normative assumptions with 
deep roots in Yugoslavia and the Western world.  
It should come as no surprise that terms such as “urban,” “rural,” “peasant” and 
“urbanite” are far from neutral. Indeed, before moving to explain how Western and urban self-
identity were constructed in opposition to the rural and alpine areas of Bosnia, it is important to 
keep in mind the charged significance of the aforementioned terms.2 The conception of “the city” 
as “the setting for a [more] civilized life” in the Western popular imagination has been traced 
back by many to the classical world, with city-states becoming the foremost sites of socio-
political organization (Short 1991, 41).  
In addition, the city represented freedom from the sovereign after the Middle Ages in 
northern Europe, although this representation was less common in the Balkans where cities were 
the locus of regional control and the most visible representation of Constantinople’s imperial 
                                                          
2 I focus on the Western connotative significance of ‘the city’ and ‘the countryside’ due to this paper’s concern with 
Bosnian and Western discourses. However, similar discourses can be found in other regions of the world. For 
instance, Ibn Khaldun wrote in depth about the inherent antagonism between settled urban Arabs and their nomadic 
opponents in his volume The Muqaddimah (1969).  
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reach (Norris 1999, 91; Todorova 1997, 173). Todorova points out that with the advent of the 
19th Century in Europe, the disdain of the aristocracy for the peasantry evolved into a contempt 
of the regressive, irrational culture of the countryside by the “urban bourgeois rational culture” 
(112). After all, Marx and Engels (1969) themselves asserted that towns rescued citizens from 
the idiocy (or, more accurately, isolation) of rural living (17). The city was the privileged site of 
European self-identity; more to the point, urbanization, as both a material process and a cultural 
transformation, was how Europe became “Europe” according to mainstream Western thought 
(Zijdeveld, 1998). This connection between the concept of the “city” and “civilization” was 
further entrenched by a Western understanding of the city as a place of tolerance and civility.  
The result of this ideological heritage linking Europe/civilization to urbanity is that ethnic 
violence was seen as not only against the city but also foreign to the city (Herscher 2007). 
Following this line of thinking, it follows that observers began to look outside of the city for the 
origins of violence; in other words, if violence is foreign to the city, it must be an import from 
the countryside. Of course, this constructed dichotomy of city-countryside ignores the numerous 
gradations of urbanity present in Bosnia, where no such tidy spatial division between the town 
and the countryside can be found (Grodach 2002, 77). Nevertheless, the West came to regard 
violence, especially ethnic violence, as a distinctly rural phenomenon, with non-urban areas 
fitted into a negative semantic context, solidified by lexical choices of “backward,” “primitive” 
and “traditional.” According to Keen (1999), industrialized Western societies depoliticized 
violence in non-Western locales after the Cold War by stripping them of their political and 
economic motivations and reducing them to a narrative of clashing primordial tribes. As the 
following section will demonstrate, the idealized notion of the city, and the normative 
connotations of civilization, advancement and cosmopolitanism associated with it, played a 
significant role in characterizing media and academic representations of the Bosnian war.  
A “Deliverance Scenario”: The Bosnian Conflict and Urban–Rural Cleavages in Western 
Discourse 
The Urban–Rural Cleavage Discourse in Western Newspapers  
Journalists covered the Bosnian conflict extensively, in large part due to its proximity to 
the rest of Europe, the keen audience interest in the siege of Sarajevo and the developed nature of 
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the region’s infrastructure. Several scholars have studied the media’s role in defining the Bosnian 
conflict for Western audiences, pointing out the consequences for Western policy in Bosnia that 
resulted from the media’s portrayal of the conflict (Allen and Seaton 1999). Thus, I begin my 
analysis by scrutinizing texts from Hansen’s Model 2, namely newspaper reports and editorials 
from major Western newspapers. The various examples cited in this section are far from an 
exhaustive list of the texts studied in my research; however, they provide a representative sample 
of the sort of rhetoric and discourse found in Western newspapers of that time period. In 
addition, practical considerations force the collection and analysis of texts to stop at some point. 
Following Milliken’s “stopping rule” (1999, 234), I halted my analysis when I found that the 
addition of new texts neither refined nor challenged the urban–rural cleavage discourse 
discernible in the initial source material. 
A close reading of European and North American newspapers reveals that there are 
frequent insinuations that the Bosnian conflict was driven by tensions between pacific city-
dwellers and their jingoistic rural counterparts, with the latter being culpable for the violence that 
wracked Bosnia in the 1990s. This discourse, what I term the urban–rural cleavage discourse, is 
marked by two basic assertions: that the conflict is a struggle between the city and the 
countryside, and that it is the latter, with its traditional hatreds, savagery and superstitious 
primitivism, that is to blame for the conflict. I will begin by analyzing how Western newspapers 
articulate the first assertion of the urban–rural cleavage discourse. 
Some of the most prominent Western newspapers explicitly framed the conflict as a 
battle between the city and the countryside in their reporting on Bosnia. For example, a 
Washington Post (27 February 1994) article suggests that “the struggle between cosmopolitan 
city dwellers and angry men from the hills” had been a distinguishing mark of the conflict since 
the beginning. The New York Times (30 December 1993) uses the same approach in an article 
about wartime Serbia, explaining that an enduring ideological chasm exists between “relatively 
sophisticated city dwellers and rural people who cling to centuries-old nationalist or religious 
hatred.” Another New York Times (26 December 1999) article sees the cultural gap between the 
rural mountains and the lowland cities as a primary component of “the Balkan poison -- perhaps 
the key ingredient,” contrasting Sarajevo and Belgrade, “emblems of European sophistication 
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and cultural fusion” with the archetypal Balkan village which was “a hard and pitiless 
place…where ancient feuds are nursed and passed on for generations, where change and outside 
influence is deeply mistrusted.” Peter Maass, a prominent journalist who later wrote a book 
based upon his experience reporting in Bosnia, stated: “…to a surprising extent, this was a war of 
poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance scenario” (Maass, 159). In the 
opinion of one Baltimore Sun (14 October 1992) reporter, those who were besieging Sarajevo 
were fighting to defend the city and the plains from the countryside and the mountains.  
A commonality in these causal characterizations of the war as an urban–rural struggle is 
their reliance upon evidentialities. The writers of the above texts may look at the reasons behind 
violent rural antipathy toward urban Bosnians but the issue of how they have been violent, or 
indeed whether they are hateful in the first place, goes unexamined. Subsequent references to 
rural hatreds that occur in the texts act only to strengthen this presupposition, subjugating other 
potential versions of the news story. Furthermore, texts that frame the war as an assault on urban 
modernity by the “ancient feuds” or “centuries-old…hatred” of the countryside are merely 
reformulating the common but hotly contested “ancient hatreds” trope; however, in this 
reformulation, “ancient hatreds” are synonymous with rural Bosnian villages rather than the 
Balkans as a whole.  
Moreover, journalistic descriptions of paramilitary and militia group in Bosnia often 
allude to the rural origins or supposedly rural characteristics of their members. One Washington 
Post (31 October 1994) article labels Karadzic’s followers as “brash mountain men” while an 
article in the Independent (11 August 1994) speaks of the region that became the quasi-
autonomous Republika Srpska as a land where “farming and fighting go hand in hand” and 
“soldiers move easily from tanks to tractors.” The Baltimore Sun (14 October 1992) explains that 
the Serb forces are composed of “uncontrolled wild mountain Serbs or wild irregulars,” what 
another journalist describes as “drunken hillbillies” (Maass 1997, 6). The New York Times (10 
April 1994) points to the role of the Dinaric Alps in incubating “extreme, combative elements” 
and asserts that the inhabitants come from “wild, warlike, frequently lawless societies whose 
feuds and folklore have been passed on to the present day like the potent home-brewed plum 
brandy that the mountain men begin knocking back in the morning.” Another New York Times 
  Urban–Rural Cleavages during the Bosnian War     29 
 
(24 May, 1992) journalist does admit that many figures in the militia are urban and hold 
American and European college degrees but then goes on to speak of the militiamen as “wild 
men from the remote mountainous areas of Bosnia.” 
The frequent lexical collocation of “mountains” with the various words used for 
paramilitaries is a recurring theme in Western accounts of the violence and, I would argue, 
should be seen as a linguistic trigger that stimulates in the reader’s mind the wider urban–rural 
schema analyzed in this thesis, with mountains acting as a symbol for non-urban areas in general. 
Furthermore, the abundance of quasi-synonymous terms for “uncivilized” even within a single 
newspaper article should be seen as instance of over-lexicalization, in which repetitious terms are 
layered over a text “as a pragmatic strategy of encoding ideology in news discourses” (Teo 2000, 
20). While short descriptions of the militants’ demeanour may be justified as the provision of 
basic facts pertinent to the conflict, the excessive and perhaps over-persuasive use of terms like 
“wild,” “brash” and “primitive” can signal an ideological preoccupation on the part of the writer 
or the institution that produces the text (Simpson and Mayr 2010, 112; Fowler et al. 1979). 
Lastly, it is critical to keep in mind Fairclough’s suggestion that discourse is often revealed in 
language through the use of emotive or “loaded” terminology (1995).  
The emphasis Western newspapers give to the supposedly rural nature of the war’s 
combatants can also be seen in journalists’ frequent usage of certain Serbo-Croatian slang terms. 
Local terms like seljaci [villagers] or the more pejorative divljaci [savages] and papci [an old 
Turkish word literally meaning ‘pig feet’ but the figurative meaning is closer to hillbillies] began 
to make an appearance in Western newspaper reporting and editorials soon after Serb 
paramilitaries encircled Sarajevo. For instance, Marcus Tanner of the Independent (26 April 
1992) declares the real conflict to be between city-dwellers and “the Papci…bad country 
people.” In a different article, Radovan Karadzic is described as “papak, the bumpkin from 
Montenegro” (Hugeux, 1995), while a New York Times (24 May 1992) journalist opts for the 
local word “divljaci” [savages] to describe members of ethnic militias. However, during the 
course of this thesis’ research, there were very few other examples of Serbo-Croatian words 
being integrated into Western newspapers. Thus, the uncritical inclusion of selected pejorative 
terms like papci and divljaci in Western reporting indicates that the uncivilized, rural character 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 56/2017      30 
 
of the militants was seen as an integral aspect of their militancy and a key to understanding the 
conflict.  
One of the most illustrative instances of the urban–rural cleavage discourse being 
invoked by the press is the common depiction of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic as a peasant 
arrival to Sarajevo, whose frustrated ambitions and peasant mentality combined to create the 
architect of destruction he became in the 1990s (Woodward 1995, 250). One headline in the Irish 
Times (17 June 1995) summed up the current siege of Sarajevo as the “revenge of Dr. K., 
country bumpkin, on the smart-talking people of Sarajevo.” The article proceeded to recount 
how the Karadzic family left the “harsh backdrop of Mount Durmitor”3 for Sarajevo when 
Radovan was a teenager, allowing Radovan to become a medical student who attended literary 
clubs, wrote poetry in his spare time and studied in New York on a Fulbright scholarship. 
However, according to an apocryphal anecdote repeated in many Western articles, the nascent 
poet-psychiatrist found little acclaim during his three decades in Sarajevo (Toael and Dahlman 
2011, 88). As a result,  
[Karadzic] never forgave this urban elite for having treated him with such disdain. 
Perhaps the viciousness with which the Serbian artillerymen today try to reduce the 
Bosnian capital to ashes reflects Karadzic's troubled desire for vengeance. (Huguex, 
1995)  
 
Several of the various themes presented thus far were reiterated in other Western media profiles 
of Karadzic; indeed, a causal relationship between Karadzic’s contemporary militarism and the 
“backwards” nature of his hometown is implicitly and explicitly established in many Western 
newspapers. According to one American paper (San Jose Mercury News, 16 June 1995), 
Karadzic is as “rough-hewn as the mountains of Montenegro where he was born” and the 
Karadzic family was composed of “very poor people, primitive, with a village mentality." 
Karadzic’s rural “mentality” was echoed in a Washington Post (9 June 1995) article that 
attributed the Serbs’ intransigence at peace talks to their leader’s “mountain mentality -- a sense 
of being isolated and still wanting the rules set by them.”  
                                                          
3 Mount Durmitor is one of the highest points in Montenegro’s mountainous interior.  
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In light of Karadzic’s four decades in Sarajevo, his medical training, his schooling 
abroad, his career in psychiatry and his involvement in local literary circles, the media’s 
attribution of Karadzic’s undisputable ruthlessness to his “ruralness,” so to speak, is at first 
perplexing. However, Karadzic’s peasant reputation makes sense when considered within a 
discursive context that equates urbanity with tolerance and peasantry with brutish “Balkan” 
antagonism. As mentioned earlier, the concept of urbanity was so ideologically tethered to 
civilized Europe that ethnic violence could only be seen as foreign to the city, or at the very least 
an import from the rural hinterland to the city. When confronted by an urban intellectual who is 
also a militant ethno-nationalist, in other words someone who cannot be neatly placed into the 
pre-existing schemata, urban Bosnians and sympathetic foreigners are forced to seek out 
evidence that Karadzic was actually not so urban after all. Thus, the “rural” designation refers 
“less to actual social facts than to ascribed cultural mentalities” (Steffanson 2007, 63).  
Karadzic was not the only militant leader whose chauvinism was attributed to his rural 
roots. Indeed, symbolic oppositions between rural and urban were recursively projected onto 
most ethno-nationalist leaders. An article in the Guardian (20 August 1995) sees many of the 
nationalist leaders as “country boys from the rural fringes of the respective nations: frontier 
fanatics” and points to the provincial childhoods of Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia’s authoritarian 
leader, and Gojki Susak, the jingoistic Croatian defence minister. It must be noted, however, that 
both of these “country boys” spent the majority of their lives in major metropolitan areas; Susak 
immigrated to Canada in early adulthood and spent the decades preceding the conflict as the 
owner of a pizzeria in Ottawa (The New York Times, 5 May 1998). 
Another New York Times article published after the war added Serb paramilitary leader 
General Ratko Mladic and Croatia’s then president Franjo Tudjman to the list of war criminals 
from small towns (26 December 1999). The same article concludes by claiming that the political 
and economic fragmentation of Yugoslavia prompted the aforementioned leaders to regress to 
the “primitive laws and passions of the village”. Reportage in the Times (6 August 1993) agrees, 
fixing blame on the “parochial and patriarchal rural culture, ethnically pure, fearful of urban 
energy, [which] took up arms against the cities” and declaring that it is this culture that produced 
most of the conflict’s decision-makers. A Washington Post report (14 June 1992) cites one 
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Sarajevan, who claims that those responsible for the violence were born in “little country towns 
that nobody has ever heard of.” Even when Western journalists do acknowledge the urban 
upbringing of many ethno-nationalist leaders, it is deftly explained away by claiming that “the 
Balkan village’s medieval code of honor and loyalty” is so deeply ingrained in the Bosnian 
psyche that “city dwellers seem to return to its thrall in moments of crisis” (The New York Times, 
26 December 1999). Furthermore, even when political and economic factors behind the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia are considered, it is seen only as a catalyst that prompts Yugoslav 
leaders to regress to the “primitive laws and passions of the village” (26 December 1999).  
It is clear that Western journalists and their urban Bosnian informants were willing to 
frame ethno-nationalists, as well as ethno-nationalism itself, as a product of the countryside. 
Journalistic descriptions of urban politicians slipping inexorably “backwards,” regressing to the 
aforementioned “primitive laws and passions of the village,” also point to the advantages of 
Todorova’s theory of Balkanism over Bakic-Hayden’s application of traditional Orientalism to 
the region. While Bakic-Hayden sees the West’s approach to the Balkans as a replication of 
Orientalism, Todorova shows how the Balkans occupies a transitory place in Western minds.  
Indeed, Todorova posits that the Balkans’ fragile “in-betweeness” is one of its salient 
features, distinguishing its representation in the West from that of the Orient, a place that is seen 
as wholly ‘other’ and diametrically opposed to the West (18). Western unease with the Balkans’ 
tenuous and liminal symbolic position at the borders of Europe reveals itself in concerns over the 
violent irrationality of the “Balkan village,” an ever-present spectre that threatens to drag urban 
Bosnians out of the rational, civilized European sphere and back down to the Balkans. 
Consequently, Western media portrayals of the war should be seen as a repackaged form of 
Balkanism in which the vices previously ascribed to the Balkans as a whole are now attributed to 
the rural population only.  
The Urban–Rural Cleavage Discourse in Western Academia  
The following paragraphs extend this thesis’ analysis of the urban–rural cleavage 
discourse in texts to Hansen’s Model 3B, material produced by academics and marginal 
publications, by including academic texts from scholars in North America and western Europe. 
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Widening the scope of my analysis to contain academic texts can reveal intertextual discursive 
dialogues among different genres and, as Hansen points out, suggest the extent of a discourse’s 
hegemony. Moreover, the inclusion of academic texts in my analysis represents a departure from 
other works of discourse analysis regarding the Bosnian war, which generally focus on the 
disconnect between serious scholarly examinations of the war and political/journalistic framing 
of the conflict and its causes. However, unlike the “ancient hatreds” discourse, which had always 
dominated popular media and literature more than academic study (Cohen and Dragovic-Soso 
2008), I contend in the ensuing paragraphs that many serious academic studies articulated some 
of the implicit assumptions and logic of the urban–rural cleavage discourse. 
Sabrina Ramet’s article “Nationalism and the Idiocy of the Countryside: the Case of 
Serbia” (1996) can be seen as an example of academic engagement with the urban–rural 
cleavage discourse. Ramet’s central argument is that the rise of nationalist parties in the decade 
prior to the war represents the triumph of rural culture over the ideals of the city (75). 
Furthermore, the author argues that the xenophobia, dogmatism and misogyny of nationalism in 
Yugoslavia are the result of its “rural character” (75). For Ramet, it goes almost without saying 
that the countryside is mired in “social ignorance and unconscious tolerance” (72), serving as 
“the repository of chauvinism” (80) where “the dominant mood is one of resentment” (81). 
Ramet goes on to contrast the countryside’s mores and temperament with the cosmopolitanism 
and secular values of the city (72), which she alleges fell victim to nationalism, “a profoundly 
rural phenomenon” (76). Ramet supports her arguments by pointing out that ethnic violence 
flared up first in rural areas in the lead up to war and by documenting the salience of rural 
symbols and tradition in Serbian culture; neither of these points are incorrect in and of 
themselves.  
However, Ramet doesn’t consider the possible practical reasons that violence might begin 
in economically disadvantaged and isolated areas, which experienced weaker central authority 
and were often politically and economically excluded from mainstream Yugoslav society 
(Allock 2002, 100-3), a reality exacerbated by the roll out of IMF liberalization policies during 
that period (Woodward 1995, 50-55). By contrast, Ramet is satisfied with linking ethnic violence 
in the countryside to the culture of the region itself. In addition, while it is true that rural 
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traditions were often re-purposed for nationalist purposes during the 1990s, it is unclear if this 
proves that nationalism in Yugoslavia was a rural phenomenon. Furthermore, Ramet barely 
acknowledges that some academics have linked nationalism with the rise of industrialized major 
population centres, not the countryside or mountain villages (Carment and James, 1997). Indeed, 
it is mentioned only briefly that many of the urban elite abetted the development of ethno-
nationalism in Yugoslavia, failing to fully acknowledge the well-documented role of urban 
intellectuals (Woodward, 85) and politicians in fostering jingoism.  
Other Western academics echoed Ramet’s characterization of the war as a struggle of 
rural militancy against progressive but defenceless urbanity. Donia and Fine (1994), who 
together wrote one of the most authoritative books on the conflict, comment that it was the 
“relatively uneducated armed hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture” that “allowed 
themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units” (28). Donia and Fine’s image of rural 
militants can be contrasted to their appraisal of urban Bosnians as “cultured Europeans, 
representing the best in Bosnia” (9). The two authors imply that the urban cosmopolitanism of 
Sarajevo makes its inhabitants “Europeans.” The privileged symbolic position as “Europeans” 
Donia and Fine give to Sarajevans is in stark contrast with that of their non-urban counterparts, 
who are separated from Europe by their traditional rural antagonisms and anti-urban hostility. 
When studying Donia and Fine’s discussion of the chasm between armed hillsmen and cultured 
Sarajevans, one can detect echoes of traditional Balkanism, where European writers of previous 
decades described the gulf between the advancement of Europe and the brutish Oriental 
primitivism of the Balkans.  
Another academic, Mieczysław P. Boduszyński (2010), writes of the tension in Balkans 
between the “collective, neotraditional, anti-Western, illiberal culture associated with rural areas 
and a cosmopolitan, civic, modernizing, liberal orientation associated with urban areas” (194), 
with the Bosnian conflict representing a defeat of the latter at the hands of the former. Steven 
Burg and Paul Shoup (1999) see the conflict as a contest between rural regions dominated by 
nationalist cultures and the civic spirit of the larger urban centres, while Bettina Gruber (2013) 
asserts that Yugoslavia has been subject to a “retraditionalization” during its dissolution, with 
ethno-nationalistic ideology accompanying a “broad cultural contamination” (22) of the cities 
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(presumably by rural Bosnians). Michael Ignatieff (1998) goes a step further, deeming the entire 
conflict a “village war.” Chris Bennett (1995), in his well-received Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences, suggests that it was the divide between rural and 
urban communities, not that between ethnicities, that helped to set the stage for bloodshed in 
Bosnia (63).  
One can see further evidence of the popularity of the urban–rural cleavage discourse 
among many academics in an anecdote related by Ger Duijzing (2007) in his review of an article 
by Robert Hayden. Duijzing repeats an account detailed in his own book, History and Memory in 
Eastern Bosnia, in which the largely-Muslim municipal council of Srebrenica convened at the 
start of the war to oust the presiding Muslim mayor and his supporters, who were reluctant to 
meet the demands of local Serb nationalists, in the interest of preserving peace (118). According 
to the townspeople, the former mayor represented a “village” faction of “peasants” who had no 
place in an urban center like Srebrenica (118). After recounting this story, Duijzing claims that 
this anecdote demonstrates how “urban–rural divisions crosscut ethnic ones” during the war in 
Bosnia (118). 
While the above anecdote undoubtedly informs Duijzing’s observation, his reluctance to 
critically interrogate the notions of “urban–rural divisions” or the label “village faction” is 
disappointing. After all, the terms “village” or “peasant” are saturated with normative meaning. 
While the urban–rural or city-village dichotomy may be articulated in geographical terminology 
it is, in practice, based more upon perceived identity and behaviour than a simple reflection of 
fixed geographical or material facts. By treating “rural” as a straightforward social category, 
Duijzing and other writers reify a normative label that is as much a social construction as any of 
the ethnic division of Bosnia. The frequency with which Western academics link the Bosnian 
conflict to “villages”, “hills” and rural “traditions” suggests that many Western academics 
reproduced the urban–rural cleavage discourse. Indeed, rather than serving as a scholarly 
bulwark against this conceptualization by Western media, many academics implicitly or 
explicitly incorporated it into their analysis.  
Martin Coward, an English academic specializing in International Politics and Security 
Studies, is another academic whose studies of the Bosnian war often reproduced the urban–rural 
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cleavage discourse. Coward’s understanding of the conflict is especially important given that he 
is largely responsible for popularizing the notion of “urbicide.” Coward’s first usage of 
“urbicide” theory focused on the mutilation of Bosnian cities during the 1990s and he quickly 
dispensed with the idea that the severe damage done to cities in the Bosnian conflict was the 
result of collateral damage, instead positing that the urban destruction that accompanied the 
Bosnian war should be seen as attempted urbicide (2001, 99). Urbicide, according to this new 
conceptual definition, was the intentional and systematic destruction of cities, not merely as part 
of eradicating a people (as in genocide) but as an end in and of itself. Coward argues that 
urbanity’s defining characteristic is its “heterogeneity in which identity is constituted in relation 
to difference” (2004, 169), a heterogeneity that stands in direct opposition to the homogeneity 
and denial of difference that ethno-nationalists cherish. As a result, the physical infrastructure 
that marked Bosnian urban society, the built environment that symbolizes urban pluralism, was 
just as targeted for elimination as the physical bodies of Bosniaks were with urbicide in Bosnia 
as “a phenomenon in its own right” (2006, 150), apart from the wider attempts at ethnic 
cleansing and genocide.  
Coward’s research on the urban destruction wrought by the Bosnian conflict is 
meticulous and can offer academics insights into the interplay between war, genocide and urban 
destruction but his conceptual framework of “urbicide” in Bosnia appears to rest upon 
assumptions reminiscent of the urban–rural cleavage narrative found in other works. For 
instance, when referring to the notion of “urbanity” represented by the city and allegedly 
despised by its rural opponents during the Bosnian conflict, Coward points out that “urban” is 
seen in the Western world as a way of life “…that is in some way more civilized. Whilst I do not 
want to dwell on this normative connotation, it is important to note the way in which urbanity 
derives its meaning through an opposition with the rural way of life” (54). Coward imbues 
Sarajevo with the attributes of any proper city: pluralism, culture, tolerance, etc. In the words of 
one scholar, “…Sarajevo was not just a city under siege. It became the city under siege- a 
symbol of tolerance and culture under attack by violence and ignorance” (Dell’Agnese 2003, 7). 
Of course, Sarajevans themselves enthusiastically reproduced the representation of Sarajevo as a 
model of European cosmopolitanism (Kurtovic 2012, 220). Thus, it would appear that Coward’s 
framing of the war as a targeted attack by intolerant anti-urban rural militias on urban centres, 
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and ‘urbanity’ itself, seems to coincide neatly with the imagined ideas of “urban” and “rural” 
present in the urban/rural dichotomy, thus warranting a closer examination of the “normative 
connotations” Coward declines to dwell on.  
The “Recommendations on the Cultural Situation in the Former Yugoslavia,” prepared 
and delivered by the Council of Europe, engages with this perceived relationship between 
urbanity and sophisticated civilization, declaring that the physical degradation of urban Bosnian 
structures represented a breakdown in “European civilization and values” (1994). It appears that 
the Council of Europe saw urban architecture as synonymous with Europe and civilization. The 
consequence of this notion is that the perpetrators of this degradation are constructed as a non-
European, and thus, uncivilized Other. Besides perpetuating the urban–rural cleavage discourse, 
this articulation of urban destruction as something contrary to European values and civilization is 
rather absurd in light of Europe’s own history with urban self-destruction during the 20th 
Century. 
It is not the intention of this section to claim that all Western journalists and academics 
reproduced some or all of the urban–rural cleavage discourse in their coverage of the Bosnian 
conflict. However, it seems clear that a number of the most prominent newspapers and most 
widely read scholarly books on the conflict linked the Bosnian conflict to “villages”, “hills” and 
rural “traditions”, whether consciously or not. The characterization of the Balkans as intrinsically 
“rural”, with the exception of Sarajevo, extends to Western imagery of the region’s inhabitants, 
whose mores, demeanour and temperament are linked to the landscape. This is done sometimes 
explicitly and other times through the use of certain signals (e.g. “mountain-men,” “tribal”) that 
denote the wider narrative of rural savagery. Given the close relationship between the idea of 
“the city” and notions of tolerance and progress in Western political thought, the image of the 
Balkans as a non-urbanized region likely widened the perceived gulf between the cosmopolitan 
and advanced West and the backwards and intolerant Balkans.  
I contend that this constructed dichotomy should be seen as an instance of Balkanism. A 
central tenet of post-colonial scholarship is the understanding that the self-identity of an imperial 
power rests upon its supposed contrast to a recognized Other. While Bakic-Hayden, Hayden and 
Todorova differ on how exactly this Other was constructed and in what specific image, they 
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agree that this image helped the West to understand and legitimize its own self-image. However, 
it seems apparent that these scholars have overlooked one of the most central stereotypes of the 
Balkans: its supposedly “rural” character, upon which the fault for all manner of non-Western 
ills (e.g. irrationality, barbarism, squalor) is assigned. Identifying ethno-nationalism with a 
primeval Balkan countryside allowed the West to shore up on its own self-identity as a place of 
tolerance and cosmopolitanism, of cities and urban values, while further pushing large portions 
of the Balkans out of the idealized European community. However, this process of 
differentiation upon degrees of perceived urbanity/civilization is not only found in Western 
discourse on the conflict. The following sections explain how nesting Balkanism occurred in the 
region, with the internationally focused urbanites and intellectuals of the ex-Yugoslav states 
reproducing the urban–rural cleavage discourse discussed thus far for their own aims. 
Barbarians at the Gates of Rome: Discourse in Yugoslavia and Bosnia  
Thus far, the urban–rural cleavage discourse has been evaluated at the level of Western 
newspapers and academia. However, I think it is important to go deeper and to analyse how 
urban intellectuals and public figures within Yugoslavia and Bosnia produced the urban–rural 
cleavage discourse in their writings and interactions with Westerners. After all, scholars are 
beginning to take Bakic-Hayden’s lead in studying nesting Balkanism and the co-opting of 
Balkanist discourse by groups within the region. It should be stressed that the Bosnian war was 
not simply framed as an urban–rural battle by Western writers and then unconsciously repeated 
by Bosnians and other citizens of the former Yugoslav states. In addition to robbing the people 
of that region of their agency, this assumption overlooks the various ways in which the urban–
rural cleavage discourse was refined and legitimized by many Bosnian academics, writers and 
politicians.  
In fact, the relationship between Yugoslav intellectuals, “Balkan experts” and Western 
media was a crucial factor in the propagation of the urban–rural cleavage discourse. After all, a 
community often accepts as fact the knowledge that is produced by sources seen as credible or 
authoritative, such as mainstream media or scholars (Nesler et al 1993). Consequently, Yugoslav 
intellectuals’ articulations of the urban–rural cleavage discourse, which were often quoted in 
major Western news outlets, deserve special attention. The following sections will chart the 
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development of this discourse in the decades leading up to the 1990s conflict, beginning with a 
focus on the impact of Jovan Cvijic and Dinko Tomasic, two academics whose theories were 
critical in shaping and legitimizing the idea of urban–rural cleavages in Bosnia and the other ex-
Yugoslav states.  
Jovan Cvijic, Dinko Tomasic and the Intellectual Roots of the Urban–Rural Discourse in 
Yugoslav Academia  
Jovan Cvijic was an ethnologist and geographer in Serbia at the turn of the 20th Century 
whose ethno-geographical taxonomy, represented best in The Balkan Peninsula and Southern-
Slavic Countries, shaped and influenced later sociological understandings of the Balkans. First 
published in French at the end of the First World War, The Balkan Peninsula and Southern-
Slavic Countries was an extensive academic foray into the various ethnic groups of what was 
soon to become Yugoslavia. Cvijic wrote that there are two main types of societal organization 
and “ethno-psychological types” in the Balkans: the “Highlanders” and the “Lowlanders.” 
According to Cvijic, echoing a narrative already established in the Balkans, there was a large-
scale retreat of the Christian population into the mountains in the wake of the Ottoman conquest 
(Brunnbauer and Pichler 2002). Cvijic claimed that the Slavs who remained on the fertile and 
relatively urbanized plains compromised with their new rulers, while those who now resided in 
the mountains maintained an adversarial and combative attitude. Of course, Cvijic’s narrative 
conflicts with the research of Ottoman experts who note that the migration of Slavs from the 
agricultural valleys and plains to the highlands occurred well before Ottomans advanced into the 
Balkan peninsula (Brunnbauer and Pichler 2002).  
Nevertheless, Cvijic based his ethno-psychological classification upon this initial fissure 
between highland Slavs and lowland Slavs, claiming that the highland peoples were 
characterized by martial courage, strict honour systems and a love of liberty (Brunnbauer and 
Pichler 2002). Cvijic’s research asserted that the rugged terrain of the Dinaric mountain range 
fostered small but competitive and tight-knit clans, which in turn nurtured the heroic martial 
virtues found in the highlanders. When one Serb general justified his indiscriminate shelling of 
the coastal city of Dubrovnik by stating “zero elevation produced a zero category of people” 
(Kiernan 2008, 593), he was channelling Cvijic’s purported links between terrain and culture. 
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Another example of this attitude can be found in the distinction drawn by Nikola Koljević, a 
leader of Republika Srpska and former professor at the University of Sarajevo, between the 
“agrarian tender souls” of lowland Serbia proper and the “fighting spirit” of those in Republika 
Srpska (Brunnbauer and Pichler 2002). 
The creation and development of the highlander/lowlander narrative in Yugoslavia was 
conditioned in part by the ideological and historical milieu Cvijic was writing in. To begin with, 
Cvijic was no doubt influenced by the geopolitical shifts occurring in the region at the time. 
Cvijic himself participated in the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War, 
lobbying the victorious powers to create a Kingdom of Yugoslavia out of the remnants of the 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire. As such, Cvijic had an obvious incentive to portray at 
least some of the Yugoslavs as naturally pre-disposed to nation-state building. Indeed, as Marko 
Zivkovic (1997) points out, Cvijic romanticized the mountainous South Slavs as noble freedom-
lovers, ardent opponents of Oriental occupation and natural statesmen. Cvijic’s success at the 
Paris Peace Conference and his subsequent academic success in Yugoslavia (where he is still 
considered the founder of geography and anthropology in the region) cemented Cvijic’s 
ethnological theories and transformed them into national ideals (Jovanovic 1991, 83).  
The growth of the highlander/lowlander dichotomy was also fostered by Western 
ideological and academic trends. At the time, many Western academics sought to categorize 
races or ethnicities based upon supposedly inherent personality traits, attempting to give ideas of 
national identity a scientific foundation (Yeomans 2007, 97); the popularity of Cvijic’s “Dinaric 
type” and highland/lowland distinctions can be seen as a result of this trend. Additionally, 
Cvijic’s ideals seem to draw upon certain elements of what Hansen terms “the Byronic Balkans,” 
an 18th and 19th Century European view of the Balkans in which the region was seen through a 
Romanticist lens (Hansen 2006, 88). The valorization of courageous and tough “liberators” was a 
vital component of the Romanticist optic, as was the constitution of “the rural” as the essence of 
“the People” (Goldsworthy 1998, 23).  
Consequently, one can see how Cvijic’s image of the highland Dinarics, a martial race of 
freedom-loving mountain-men that represented the Serbian volksgeist, fit neatly within, and 
academically reified, the Byronic Balkans narrative described by Hansen. Cvijic’s 
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contemporaries received his scholarship warmly and Cvijic’s Völkerpsychologie, a type of study 
mostly regarded now as the embarrassing antecedent of contemporary anthropology and human 
geography, was kept alive in the former Yugoslavia for decades by many academics (Halpern 
and Hammel 1969, 21). Nevertheless, European Romanticist images regarding the Balkans were 
being gradually supplanted by a civilizational, and thus pejorative, discourse by the time Cvijic 
published his theories.  
Indeed, shortly after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established, the 
Croatian sociologist Dinko Tomasic rearticulated Cvijic’s theories in his seminal work 
Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics (1945). Despite its title, the book focused 
primarily on Yugoslavia and rested heavily upon Cvijic’s research and theories. However, 
Tomasic reinterpreted the supposed nobility and courage of the highlander, the “natural 
statesmanship,” as atavistic pugnacity. In other words, Tomasic reversed Cvijic’s valuation of 
the highlander type. According to Tomasic, the Dinaric Alps and the rural highland of central 
Yugoslavia bred “out-laws, guerrilla fighters, mercenaries, military leaders, dynasts and political 
terrorists” (449). Like Cvijic, Tomasic’s theories were likely shaped, at least in part, by wider 
historical and ideological trends shifts. The wider turn in Western views on the Balkans away 
from the Romanticist Byronic Balkans and toward a civilizational discourse is reflected in 
Tomasic’s rearticulation of the highlander/lowlander dichotomy.  
While Romanticist notions of nationalism inspired Cvijic, Tomasic was inspired by the 
modern, industrial ideals adopted by the new socialist regime. Indeed, the socialist ideology 
espoused by Tito’s government after the war attempted to mould an urban proletariat by 
promoting urbanity and class consciousness, championing “essentially urban views of the nature 
and direction of development” (Allcock 2002, 103) while dismissing the rural peasantry and their 
culture as “obstacles to modernisation” (103), with no proper role to play in the new modes of 
production (Pickering 2006; Diamond 1980, 442). As a result, Tomasic’s reappraisal of the 
Highland/Dinaric type can be seen as a reflection of the prevailing belief in the superiority of 
industry and modernity, as represented by the city and agriculture. Tomasic’s writings also 
presage the narrative of urban–rural cleavages that came to the forefront during the 1990s. 
Indeed, Tomasic went as far as saying that the main struggle in Yugoslavia was between the 
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culture of settled, lowland farmers and the Dinaric warriors who were then filling the upper 
echelons of the Yugoslav military and government (1948, 204).  
The Urban–Rural Cleavage Discourse and Local Interpretations of the Bosnian Conflict  
I argue that the ethno-psychological frame Cvijic and Tomasic provided lasted far beyond 
their time and contributed to the establishment of the urban–rural cleavage discourse in the 
minds of many Yugoslavs. For instance, Zivkovic (1997) notes that the celebrated Belgrade 
psychiatrist Vladimir Adamovic, just before war broke out in 1991, proclaimed that the 
“Dinarics” had overtaken the police, military, party and state apparatus; thus, in Adamovic’s 
mind, these institutions will be led by people inclined to aggressiveness and fanaticism. In 
addition, the popular writer Danko Popovic (1993) complained that Serbian institutions were like 
“a colony populated by primitive tribes” in which the highlanders are pushing a “tribal spirit and 
habits on an area which is legally organized as a state” (93). Also during the war, the powerful 
Belgrade periodical NIN ran a series of essays called “The Dinarics and the Serbians” (Zivkovic 
1997). The fondness in Yugoslav intellectual circles for the highland/lowland binary opposition, 
as well as the wider urban–rural cleavage discourse it feeds into, is revealing as academics often 
legitimatize certain discourse due to their privileged position as knowers of scientific “truth” 
(Milliken 1999, 229). 
Indeed, intellectuals in the former Yugoslavia were not the only public figures to cling to 
the theories and terminology propagated by Tomasic and Cvijic, as illustrated by Stjepan 
Mestrovic and Slaven Letica’s Habits of the Balkan Heart (1993). Mestrovic, a distinguished 
American sociologist of Croatian descent who provided expert testimony to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Letica, a one-time adviser to the 
Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, drew heavily from Tomasic to explain the various “social 
characters” behind post-communism in South-eastern Europe. Mestrovic’s suggests that the 
disorder following the collapse of Yugoslavia was the latest manifestation of an age-old pattern 
of conflict between nomadic mountain Yugoslavs and settled, lowland Yugoslavs. Several social 
scientists have criticized Mestrovic’s reliance on Tomasic’s cultural typology, raising concerns 
that borderline essentialist theories are being given to the ICTY and even suggesting that 
Mestrovic’s theory of social character “borders on straightforward racism” (Allcock 2002). 
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Mestrovic’s explanations epitomize what Gupta and Ferguson call the “naturalized association of 
culture with place” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 35). I would also point out that the value of 
Mestrovic’s approach seems to rest more in its rhetorical description than actual explanatory 
value. 
Nevertheless, Mestrovic’s book marked an minor revival in academia of the brutal 
Balkan mountaineer stereotype as an explanatory model for the intensification of hostilities in 
Bosnia. For instance, several German scholars (Grandits and Halpern 1994, 101; Kaser 1995, 10) 
also began to use Tomasic’s classifications and Sabrina Ramet (1999), mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, quotes Tomasic’s description of Dinaric Serb culture to illustrate rural Serbs’ 
susceptibility to ethno-nationalist narratives (79). In addition, Western newspapers began 
mentioning both Tomasic and Mestrovic specifically in their reports on the conflict, writing that 
the age-old clash between rural highlanders and urban lowlanders outlined by both theorists has 
doomed the region to the “authoritarianism of the Balkan past, Byzantium” (Sydney Herald, 12 
March 1994) and that the relatively peaceful regions of Serbia owe their placidity to “the mild 
personality of those who live on open plains, in contrast to the warrior mentality of those who 
inhabit the craggy terrain prevalent elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia” (The New York Times, 
30 August 1995). It is clear that the academic conceptualizations produced by Tomasic and 
Cvijic shaped and bolstered the legitimacy of the urban–rural cleavage discourse by constructing 
a dichotomy between urban and rural Yugoslavs, associating rural/highland Yugoslavs with 
obstinate and antagonistic traditionalism.  
Linking contemporary rearticulations of Bosnian rural and urban identity to Tomasic and 
Cvijic’s theories from previous decades may seem dubious; after all, one might assume that 
Western acceptance of these anachronistic ideas would have evolved or withered at some point 
during the ensuing years. However, this phenomenon is significantly less perplexing when seen 
in light of the relative paucity of European and American writing on Bosnian society between the 
Second World War and the outbreak of hostilities in the 1990s. Outside of narrow academic 
research, there was relatively little Western interest in Bosnian or Yugoslav society (Todorova 
1997, 184).  
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Yet this is not to say that the Cold War period allowed the previous Balkanist discourses 
to wither and fade away. By contrast, the socialist period in Yugoslavia was commonly 
conceptualized in the West as an ephemeral intermission in Balkan history, in which the violent 
passions intrinsic to that region were frozen in place, lying dormant until the collapse of 
socialism allowed them to thaw (Hatzopoulos 2008, 60). In other words, the West saw the nearly 
five decades of peaceable coexistence and industrialization in Yugoslavia as a short-lived 
aberration from the Balkans’ history as a place of primitivism and irrational animosity, an 
aberration sustained only by Tito’s sheer force of will. As a result of socialism’s weak imprint 
upon Western imagery of the Balkans, Western observers fell back upon older, well-trodden 
conceptualizations of the region when they reported on the Yugoslav conflict, conceptualizations 
that were facilitated by the “fixity” of the Balkans (Hansen 2006, 95).  
According to post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha, fixity is a strategy of othering that 
regards the cultural/historical Other as unchanging and doomed to “disorder, degeneracy and 
daemonic repetition” (Babha 1994, 66). Accordingly, the West’s construction of the Balkans as a 
place incapable of change, in the face of contemporary scholarship that maintains that cultures 
and habits are evolving and constructed rather than static facts (Clifford 1988; Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983), legitimized the deployment of theories that might otherwise be dismissed as 
antiquated or irrelevant to the modern era if they had been applied to regions other than the 
Balkans. As a result, there was initially little resistance to attempts to resuscitate and apply 
Tomasic and Cvijic’s ideas to the violence of the 1990s. Indeed, much of the discourse I have 
recounted in this thesis regarding urban–rural differences can be seen as an intertextual dialogue 
with the writings of Cvijic and Tomasic. 
For instance, Professor Anton Bebler, political scientist at the University of Ljubljana, 
was quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald as stating that the various generals involved in the war 
are like “…mountaineers and sheep breeders. They are very autonomous, proud and warlike” (6 
July 1991). In an interview reprinted in an American newspaper, Milos Vasic, the editor of 
prominent anti-war journal Vreme, describes the war as “anthropological”, clarifying that: 
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We always divided our population more by altitude than by language or ethnic group. 
First, there is the mountain cattlemen approach. The other is the farmers' approach. The 
cattlemen perceive the world in terms of space for their herds; the farmers, in terms of 
time for their crops. That is why the wild mountain men with no sense of humour are the 
driving force of this war. And that is why Sarajevo and Mostar were so savagely 
destroyed. These cities are a different civilization to guys frustrated by not being able to 
settle in them. (The Baltimore Sun, 14 October 1992) 
 
Vasic’s delineation of aggressive, alpine pastoralists and lowland/urban farmers are not only 
echoes of the urban–rural cleavage discourse; they are an implicit engagement with the theories 
produced by Tomasic and Cvijic.  
Bogdan Bogdanovic, a former Mayor of Belgrade and an acclaimed Yugoslav architect 
and public intellectual, was another instrumental figure in the popularization of the urban–rural 
cleavage discourse. Bogdanovic’s jeremiads against what he saw as anti-urbanism in the war 
were cited in several subsequent academic articles on the conflict (Rusinow 1996) and 
republished in major newspapers throughout Europe (Bogdanovic 1995, 41). For instance, a New 
York Times article in 1994 saw the war as a clash between the “traditional folk and religious 
values of the villages against cities like Sarajevo”, citing Bogdanovic who declared it to be “a 
war of the mountains against the cities” (Kifner 1994). Consequently, Bogdanovic’s 
conceptualization of the war’s rural roots deserves close analysis.  
In a letter to the New York Review of Books, entitled “Murder of the City” and translated 
from Serbian to English, Bogdanovic laments the desecration of Yugoslavia’s urban centers: 
Sooner or later the civilized world will dismiss our internecine butchery with a shrug of 
the shoulders. How else can it react? But it will never forget the way we destroyed our 
cities. We-we Serbs- shall be remembered as despoilers of cities, latter-day Huns. 
(Bogdanovic, 1993) 
 
Bogdanovic notes the appalled Western response to the indiscriminate shelling of Bosnian cities 
like Sarajevo and remarks that Western opposition to urban destruction is not based solely upon 
fear of civilian casualties but also upon the Western equating of “cities” with “civilization”. If 
the word “urbanity” has represented dignity, sophistication and rationality in the Western world 
since the fourteenth century, it follows then that artillery bombardments on urban centers are also 
assaults on the “highest values of civilization,” Bogdanovic writes. In his letter, Bogdanovic 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 56/2017      46 
 
draws a line between “city-lovers” and “city-haters”, arguing that one of the prime movers of 
civilizational rise and fall is the Manichaean struggle between the two groups. Furthermore, 
Bogdanovic traced the current militant animus toward cities back to a long legacy of anti-
urbanism in the Balkans, “savage’s ancient, archetypal fear of the city,” remarking that even “the 
great father of our nation, Vuk Karadzic… [taught] us that Serbs prefer not to live in cities.”  
Bogdanovic was not the only public figure whose ideas regarding the urban–rural 
cleavage were taken up by Western journalists. Ivo Straus, an esteemed architect who was in 
Sarajevo during the siege, spoke derisively in his book Sarajevo: the Architects and the 
Barbarians of the city-hating “armed, toothless and illwashed [sic] primitives” (Straus 1994, 1). 
Straus’s decision to emphasize the “toothless” and “illwashed” nature of the Serb besiegers, the 
“primitives” in his words, rather than other possible negative characteristics is revealing. By 
stringing together those three descriptors, “armed,” “toothless” and “illwashed,” Straus 
rearticulates a crucial element of the urban–rural cleavage discourse by suggesting that 
“ruralness,” as signified here by poor hygiene and dental care, is integral to and quasi-
synonymous with the militancy he witnessed during the siege. It is also worthwhile to note how 
Straus’ descriptions of filth and primitivism echo the descriptions of the Balkans as a whole 
found in 20th Century Western writing. 
It was outlined earlier in this thesis that the West saw ethnic violence as both contrary 
and utterly foreign to the city (Herscher 2007), an understanding that allowed Western journalists 
to readily accept and propagate the notion that ethno-nationalism and violence came from the 
countryside to the city. Urban Bosnians conceptualized the tensions in their country in much the 
same way. Indeed, the Sarajevan liberal newspaper Oslobodjenje explicitly framed the mounting 
ethnic tension in Sarajevo as an export from the countryside into the city (Jusic 2009, 240). Anti-
war demonstrators, on the eve of their city’s four-year ordeal, carried signs proclaiming, 
“Primitives from the Parliament, go home to your villages!” (Spaskovska 2012), equating ethno-
nationalism with both primitivism and the countryside.  
The notion that nationalism was an inherently rural phenomenon, diametrically opposed 
to the European and modern values of the cities, is also on display in the attitude of Western-
minded Sarajevans to Radovan Karadzic. The ‘peasant Karadzic’ narrative was not a new 
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journalistic product but rather was the propagation of a trope urban Sarajevans articulated even 
before the war. Urban Bosnians mocked Karadzic’s urban roots: in the words of one Sarajevan, 
who was quoted in a New York Times (19 November 1992) article about the siege, “Karadzic is 
papak [hillbilly], he comes from mountains, from sheep, and he wants to be king.” Some writers, 
both Bosnian and Western, looked back on Karazdic’s 1971 poem Let’s Go Down to the Town 
and Kill Some Scum, seeing it as an omen from Karadzic of the bloodshed to come (Hukanovic 
1996). However, this poem was understood before the war as a portrait of Yugoslav peasant 
attitudes in the historical past (Danner 1998). Thus, reading the poem as an expression of 
Karadzic’s dormant anti-urban militarism is perhaps misunderstanding Karadzic’s past and 
present motivations. Karadzic often spoke fondly of Sarajevo and stated, two days after the 
infamous marketplace shelling, that he had enjoyed living in a city that culturally “looked more 
toward the West” (Danner 1998), casting doubt on the claim that it was Sarajevo’s urbane culture 
that Karadzic detested the most. 
The urban–rural cleavage narrative was propagated at some of the highest levels of 
government as well. The Bosnian Foreign Minister, for instance, linked the violence in his 
country to the hatred of the peasant for the city, likening the Serb gunners encircling Sarajevo to 
the “barbarians at the gates of Rome” in an interview entitled “New Age of the Barbarian” (The 
Times, 14 January 1993). The Foreign Minister’s framing of the conflict is emblematic of the 
urban–rural cleavage discourse’s key components. First, the Foreign Minister treats as a given 
the fact that ethno-nationalist militancy is exclusive to those from the countryside and then 
declares that anti-urbanism, rather than any rational political calculation, is at the heart of the 
bloodshed. Second, the Foreign Minister’s historical allusion formulates the siege of Sarajevo as 
a contest between Rome, with its connotations of Western advancement and civilization, and the 
“barbarians.”  
In framing the siege in this way, the Foreign Minister exalts his and his group’s identity 
as advanced/Western/European while simultaneously constructing and debasing the 
barbarous/Balkan identity of his opponents. It is important to note here that normative and 
ideological power reproduced through the above discourses was hardly reflective of material 
power during the Bosnian war. Ultimately, even high-ranking urban Bosnians were at the mercy 
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of those who had superior military armaments. Nonetheless, those being besieged were usually 
the shapers of the conflict’s dominant discursive framing; the constitutive power of these 
hegemonic discourses lay not in material superiority but in their ability to construct social 
difference (Buchowski 2006, 476). 
I argue that the reproduction of the urban–rural cleavage discourse by Bosnians, in the 
manner of the Foreign Minister, should be conceptualized as a continuation and advancement of 
the concept of nesting Balkanism. After all, as this thesis has documented, the discourse of 
urban–rural cleavages was predicated upon a supposed dichotomy between the culture and 
temperaments of rural Bosnians, and those of urban Bosnians. The characteristics of this 
dichotomy, which have been given additional academic weight by Yugoslav intellectuals who 
formulated the urban–rural cleavage as a struggle between highland/Dinaric/rural and 
lowland/urban Bosnians, closely resemble the characteristics endemic in the Balkanist discourse 
produced by Western writings on the region: instability, cruelty, boorishness, filth and 
lawlessness (Todorova 1997, 10). These supposedly Balkan categories are opposed to the 
concept of Europe, which represents “cleanliness, order, self-control, strength of character, sense 
of law, justice, efficient administration” (10). It is clear that the image of rural Bosnians 
produced by the urban–rural cleavage discourse is, to a large degree, a reflection of the image of 
the Balkans produced by the Balkanist discourse. Consequently, this parallel should be 
theoretically conceptualized as a form of nesting Balkanism.  
As detailed earlier in this thesis, Bakic-Hayden claims that the logic and dichotomies 
utilized in Orientalism or Balkanism reproduce within Yugoslavia and its successor states. As a 
result, Bakic-Hayden suggests that all societies within the Balkans construct an image of their 
neighbour that is more Oriental and less “European” than themselves, with Slovenia positioning 
itself as the European power above the Balkans, Croatia positioning itself as the frontier of 
Catholicism and the West above the Byzantine, Serbia imagining itself as the last outpost of 
Christendom at the gates of the Orient, and so forth all the way down the Balkan peninsula. 
According to Bakic-Hayden, nations in the Balkans demarcated their position on the symbolic 
cartography of south-eastern Europe according to their religion, their former imperial rulers, their 
  Urban–Rural Cleavages during the Bosnian War     49 
 
alphabet, their current political system and, today, their membership status in the European 
Union (Turkes and Gokgoz 2006).  
I contend that the discourse of urban–rural cleavages is a vital component of 
contemporary nesting Balkanism and that the perceived urbanity, or lack thereof, of a group is an 
important ingredient in the construction of a “Western” self-identity group, alongside religion, 
language, etc. Urbanity should be conceptualized as a currency that groups in the Balkans could 
use to buy membership in the “advanced European” club. In his ethnographic study of 
Sarajevans years after the war, Stef Jansen (2005) observed that their urban status could be used 
“to relate ones’ personal narrative to the larger story of European modernity” (162). So, while 
Bakic-Hayden is accurate in pointing out that most groups in the Balkans regard their southern 
neighbour as the Oriental Other, she has overlooked the fact that these groups just as often saw 
the rural inhabitants of the countryside as an internal Oriental Other, a foil against which a 
flattering self-identity could be constructed and a spot on the internal hierarchy could be staked 
out. Consequently, C.M. Andersen’s claim that, in the Balkans, “an inferiority complex develops 
which shifts to finding the ‘other’ outside one’s nation to blame” (Anderson 2007, 6) is 
incomplete, for the Other is often found within one’s nation; during the 1990s, urban Bosnians 
perceived their rural counterparts to be an Other within their own country. 
In fact, the pattern of nesting Balkanism, already shown to reproduce itself within a 
single region or nation, can be recursively reproduced, on an even smaller scale, within a single 
city. After the war ended, many urban Bosnians used the discourse of urban–rural cleavages to 
frame their discussion of other issues brought about by the conflict. For example, the influx of 
rural migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs) into urban centres after the war has led to 
considerable worry among urban Bosnians that a “peasantization” or “retraditionalization” of the 
cities is occurring (Jansen 2005, 152). The Sarajevan sociologist Alisabri Sabani (1999), for 
instance, called the influx of rural refugees into Sarajevo an “invasion” and “attack”; the 
refugees’ “rural habits” have transformed Sarajevo into a “sad urban phenomenon,” despite the 
steadfast efforts of native Sarajevans to keep their cosmopolitan culture in this “rural-urban war.” 
Cvijeto Job (1993) lamented in Foreign Policy that: 
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…industrialization, modernization, and urbanization could not transcend the vindictive 
mores of the palanka [small, rural town]. The opposite happened. With the great 
migration from the countryside, life in the cities, including the capitals of the republics 
and the federation, became increasingly dominated by a palanka mentality. Instead of the 
provinces becoming citified, the cities became countrified… (1993, 59) 
 
Anders Steffanson’s (2007) anthropological study of post-war Sarajevans describes how 
contemporary Sarajevans complain that rural newcomers impose their norms upon urban society, 
rather than adapting to the urban way of life (63). Stefansson observes that Sarajevans, including 
intellectuals and academics, frame the presence of rural Bosnians in the city as an undesirable 
intrusion of the Other into “our space” (64).  
This framing is strikingly similar to the West’s apprehensive discussion of the Balkans in 
general and should be seen as further evidence of the widespread articulation of Balkanist 
discourse within the Balkans. The Balkans have long seemed threatening to Europeans because 
they represent the “Turkey-in-Europe,” a quasi-Orient within the Occident, an uncivilized and 
violent Other “in our very midst” (Wolff, 167). The region’s ambiguous but threatening position 
in the Western imagination is an example of what Julia Kristeva (1991) terms “the disturbingly 
strange” (201), in which the negative characteristics of the Balkans represent “the otherness of 
our ourness”. Since urban Bosnians have often attributed the negative characteristics of the Other 
to rural Bosnians, the large-scale migration of rural Bosnians to the city both before and after the 
war is seen as the infiltration of the Orient into the European city. Put differently, the pattern of 
nesting Balkanism, already shown to reproduce itself within a single region or nation, is 
recursively reproduced on an even smaller scale within a single city. Using language reminiscent 
of the West’s anxiety over the Orient within Europe, urban Bosnians fret over what they see as 
the intrusion of a rural/Balkan mentality and culture into their urban/European space, a miniature 
Orient within their miniature Europe.  
Furthermore, Stefansson also discovers that Sarajevans frame pre-war Sarajevo as a 
“European city” but that they now deem it to be “one big village, Africa, the Middle East, a place 
without culture” (Steffanson 2007, 71) due to rural migration to the city; in fact, some Sarajevans 
even call rural migrants to the city “Afrikanci” [Africans] and “Indianci” [Indians] (66). This 
discursive shift starkly illustrates the precariousness of Sarajevo’s “European” status, susceptible 
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as it is to revocation if the local culture becomes more “rural”. Moreover, it also demonstrates 
how a perceived loss of urbanity moves Sarajevo southward and eastward in Sarajevans’ 
symbolic cartography, placing it decisively in the Orient and away from its precarious position 
within, or at least on the threshold of Europe’s borders. 
In summary, the central argument of this section is that the Bosnian conflict has often 
been framed as a clash between urban and rural Bosnians and that this discourse should be 
conceptualized as a form of nesting Balkanism. While Bakic-Hayden described how nesting 
Orientalism unfolded in the years immediately preceding the collapse of Yugoslavia, I have 
demonstrated that the discourse of urban–rural cleavages has deep historical roots in Yugoslav 
academic and popular thought, and that it continues to shape academic, journalistic and popular 
opinion even after the war. The reproduction of the urban–rural cleavage discourse by urban 
Bosnians is an attempt by that group to solidify their own European (and thus progressive and 
sophisticated) self-identity by contrasting it with a rural Other that can be imbued with all the 
typical negative characteristics of the Balkans (primitivism, savagery and irrationality). Put 
simply, urban Bosnians appropriated the Balkanism of the West and redirected it against their 
rural kin. A number of Yugoslav scholars abetted and legitimized the acceptance of this 
discourse by reifying the Balkan stereotypes as anthropological classifications.  
4. Conclusion 
Summary 
In conclusion, I have sought to answer two central questions. First, what is the 
relationship between the concept of urban–rural cleavages and popular discourse surrounding the 
hostilities in Bosnia? Second, how can a post-colonial theoretical framework, as elucidated by 
Said, Todorova and Bakic-Hayden, broaden and structure our understanding of how the urban–
rural cleavage discourse relates to identity in Bosnia? My argument was couched in the 
theoretical and conceptual framework of post-colonialism and Bakic-Hayden’s concept of 
nesting Orientalism, with an empirical analysis of journalistic and academic discourse on the 
Bosnia conflict that also traced the historical roots of the urban–rural cleavage discourse. In 
answer to the first question, an analysis of mainstream newspapers, statements by public figures 
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and many scholarly works has revealed that Westerners and urban Bosnians have frequently 
characterized the Bosnian War as a revenge of the countryside upon the city. In fact, this 
characterization is a component of a larger discourse of urban–rural cleavages that has been 
facilitated by a pre-existing conceptual relationship between the ideas of urbanity and progress in 
Western thought, as well as an established academic tradition of differentiating urban and rural 
cultures in Yugoslavia.  
In answer to the second main research question, this thesis has revealed that the 
propagation of the urban–rural cleavage discourse by urban Bosnians was far from a coincidence 
but rather was a form of nesting Balkanism that stemmed from a desire to reinforce one’s own 
self-identity as European by contrasting it with an image of violent and brutish rural Bosnians, 
the “true Balkans.” Post-colonial theory allows analysts to explore how the normative 
association of urbanity with modernity, and modernity with Europe, are part of the West’s image 
of itself as the pinnacle of human civilization and advancement. Furthermore, Todorova’s 
outlining of the Balkans’ special niche in the Western imagination, as a transitory and marginal 
Turkey-in-Europe, helps us to understand Western characterizations of the Bosnian war and 
make sense of contemporary Bosnian fears over rural IDPs. Bakic-Hayden’s concept of nesting 
Orientalism was developed to explain the prevalence of Orientalist discourse between the former 
Yugoslav republics but it appears increasingly clear that this concept should be expanded and 
deepened to explain urban Bosnians’ characterization of the Bosnian War as an urban–rural 
conflict. 
Significance 
I suggest that the findings of this thesis hold significance for both the real world and the 
theoretical field. First, the scripting of the Bosnian war as the inevitable result of friction 
between a progressive, secular and wealthy urban culture and an antiquated and intolerant rural 
culture allowed urban Yugoslavs to wash their hands of any potential culpability in the 
heightening of ethnic tensions. In the words of one scholar,  
Depicting war as an accomplishment of anti-urban savages from the Dinaric region is 
also a standard interpretation by the Belgrade opposition, which is desperately interested 
in situating the evil in the rural area, in order to be capable of believing in its own 
innocence (Baskar 1991, 61). 
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To this day, some urban Bosnians refer to non-nationalist and pro-EU parties as the 
“gradanska opposition,” an adjective derived from the Serbo-Croatian word grad [city] (Jansen 
2005; 152). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for urban Bosnians to tell researchers “none of the 
intellectuals with a good education started this war…” (Kolind 2008, 151), which is a striking 
assertion given that many ethno-nationalist leaders possessed doctorates from Yugoslavia’s 
leading universities; Vojislav Seselj, for instance, was Yugoslavia’s youngest PhD holder when 
he founded Serbia’s far-right Serbian Radical Party.  
Indeed, there is mounting evidence that ethno-nationalism, of the type that ostensibly 
motivated the militias and paramilitaries in Bosnia during the 1990s, was a top-down rather than 
grassroots phenomenon, cultivated by urban intellectuals and politicians who, at least according 
to rational choice explanations, stand to gain the most from ethnic collective action (Carment and 
James 1997; Gagnon 2004; O Tuathail and Dahlman 2005; O Tuathail 2010; Carmichael 2002). 
Evidently, the urban–rural cleavage discourse obscures the role of these urban elites and 
misrepresents the causal direction of ethnically motivated political movements (Steffanson 2007, 
64; Toal and Dahlman 2011, 15). As civil war researcher Stathis Kalyvas (2004) argues, there is 
a general tendency in some research and media to emphasize rural primitivism, allowing 
urbanites to collectively forget the nationalistic fervour of urban intellectuals (26-27). 
Furthermore, as several authors have pointed out, portraying cities as the war’s primary victim is 
especially cruel given the destruction of countless rural villages in Bosnia during the conflict 
(Grodach 2002, 77; Bougarel 1999, 159). The persistence of the urban–rural cleavage discourse 
in the West and in Bosnia itself will hinder any attempt to accurately explain the outbreak of 
hostilities in Bosnia in the 1990s, to say nothing of attempts at genuine reconciliation.  
Second, various scholars have linked Western political reluctance to intervene in the 
Balkans with the popular portrayal of the war as the product of tribal hatreds (Campbell 1998; 
Zohar 2012). According to Lene Hansen (2006), media representations of the war as an 
intractable quagmire in an intrinsically violent region legitimized policies of inaction. In my own 
research, I read several editorials and letters to the editor that attempted to dissuade their leaders 
from getting militarily involved in such a ‘convoluted’ war, which was, in the words of one 
writer, a “war between the hill people and the city-dwellers of Bosnia” (The Times, 7 April 
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1993). Other experts allege that Karadzic persuaded David Owen, the European Union’s envoy 
to Bosnia, to grant the Serbs territory in part because Owen believed in the popular pseudo-
anthropological narrative that asserted that Muslims had always been concentrated in cities, 
while Serbs had a traditional attachment to the agricultural countryside (Baskar 1999, 58). 
Slobodan Milosevic himself perpetuated the notion that Serbs resided in the countryside while 
urban centres were the exclusive purview of Bosnian Muslims as well, despite it being a serious 
demographic distortion (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 74, 102).  
Robert Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts (1993), the result of his travels through south-
eastern Europe shortly before Yugoslavia broke apart, described Bosnia as “rural, isolated and 
full of suspicions and hatred” and remarked that outside of the “sophisticated urban center” of 
Sarajevo “the villages all around were full of savage hatreds, leavened by poverty and 
alcoholism” (22). While Kaplan was hardly the only writer to give such ominous descriptions of 
the Bosnian countryside, his articulation of the urban–rural cleavage discourse is especially 
important given his book’s central role in convincing President Bill Clinton to abandon his ‘lift 
and strike’ policy in 1993 by popularizing the conceptualization of the Balkans as a place of 
ancient Hobbesian disorder (Drew 1994, 157).  
It appears increasingly evident that the primordialist framing of the Bosnian conflict, 
which includes the now infamous “ancient hatreds” trope, had tangible consequences for 
Western public opinion and political action. It must be stressed that I am not suggesting that the 
urban–rural cleavage discourse, rather than the “ancient hatreds” or “genocide” frames 
elucidated by researchers like Lene Hansen, should be seen as the most dominant framing of the 
war. Rather, I contend that the urban–rural cleavage discourse existed alongside other popular 
explanations for the conflict, and should be seen as acting in a similar manner to condition the 
possibilities for Western intervention in Bosnia by obscuring the very rational and calculated 
motivations behind much of the ethnic violence in that country.  
Third, my argument contributes to the field conceptually as it illustrates that the concept 
of ‘nesting Balkanism’ is broader than previously thought. While Bakic-Hayden and other 
Balkan scholars recognized the importance of religion, political tradition, and language in 
drawing the idealized borders of Europe and the Orient, there was little appreciation for how the 
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urban–rural dichotomy is used to define and condition identity in the region. In addition, my 
argument extends the nesting Orientalism/Balkanism theory by illustrating that the process of 
“delegating mechanisms” (to use Kuus’s term), in which the discursive borders between Europe 
and the Balkans are continually shifted away from one’s own nation, also occurs inside a nation. 
Furthermore, in terms of wider post-colonial study, my argument demonstrates a way of 
Othering that has often gone unexamined in research on Europe.  
Limitations of this Study and Recommendations for Further Research  
Of course, the research and discussion undertaken in this thesis has several limitations 
and methodological constraints. For example, the post-structuralist approach adopted in this 
thesis does not lend itself well to studying agency and individual motivation (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002, 17, 90). After all, post-structuralism largely conceptualizes agency as something 
realized through social relations, rather than something that rests within an individual. 
Accordingly, further research would need to be done to reveal the various motivations that 
propelled groups in Bosnia to adopt the positions they took during the conflict.  
On the level of methodology, there are several other limitations. For example, non-verbal 
elements of the textual material gathered for this thesis’ analysis, such as photographs or print 
size, could not be reliably accessed through the available online database. Accordingly, this 
thesis focused on the discourse of urban–rural cleavages present within texts. In addition, some 
scholars have called for researchers to include popular culture, such as films and television 
shows, in discourse analysis (Neumann 2008). Widening the scope of research to include such 
visual forms of media, while beyond this thesis, may help academics to understand how the 
urban–rural discourse was rearticulated visually. Furthermore, this thesis’ research was limited to 
textual material produced or translated into English. Research conducted by academics fluent in 
Serbo-Croatian could provide additional insights into how discourse was reproduced at a more 
micro-level, below the translated material of intellectuals, journalists and writers that has been 
the focus of this thesis.  
In addition, while I outlined the development of the urban–rural cleavage discourse in 
Yugoslavia as a whole, I was particularly interested in how it was rearticulated during the 
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conflict in Bosnia. However, how do discourses of urban–rural cleavages impact identity in 
places like France or Britain, where the need to assert a “Western” or “European” identity is less 
compelling? After all, while various aspects of the discourse studied in this thesis are widely 
entrenched in Western thinking, such as the connection between the ideals of urbanity and 
modernity, many European nations outside of the former Yugoslav sphere actually hold a 
romanticised, though perhaps equally problematic, view of their own countryside and its culture 
(Cloke and Milbourne 1992, 359; Bell 2006). As a result, an opportunity for further study is the 
existence of an urban–rural cleavage discourse in other geographic contexts. 
Moreover, while the reproduction of Orientalisms in the Balkans may point to the power 
of Western hegemonic ideologies, postcolonial literature is beginning to analyse the ways in 
which Orientalist discourse can be “turned on its head” by those who are the subjects of it 
(Chatterjee 1993). Consequently, future research could ascertain the extent of rural revalorization 
among Bosnians, in which the Balkan countryside is held up as the ideal type and it is the city 
and its “European” values that are disparaged. Analysis of such a phenomenon, while it is 
outside the confines of this thesis, could provide valuable insight into the ways in which 
orientalist ideology is not only adopted in the region but also reversed.  
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